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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000637-SC 
v. : 
JAMES W. MOONEY, a.k.a. JAMES : 
W.F.E. MOONEY; LINDA T. 
MOONEY; and OKLEVUEHA : 
EARTHWALKS NATIVE 
AMERICAN CHURCH OF UTAH, : 
INC., 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an interlocutory order denying defendants' motion to dismiss the 
information. Defendants were charged with one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful 
activity/racketeering, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 
(1999); and twelve counts of possession of a controlled substance in connection with a 
criminal enterprise, all first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (1998) (R. 5-1 ) (statutes attached in Addendum A). 
'Defendant/appellant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, 
Inc., was not charged with the count alleging the engagement in a pattern of unlawful 
activity/racketeering, and defendant/appellant Linda T. Mooney was charged with only 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court provide the only constitutional interpretation of the federal 
regulatory peyote exemption in determining that, to the extent the exemption was 
incorporated into Utah law, it did not apply to non-Indians? 
This is a question of statutory interpretation, reviewed on appeal for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court. See State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, TJ 6, 463 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 75; State v. Burns 2000 UT 56, % 15,4 P.3d 795; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1357 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial court violate defendants' First Amendment right to freedom of religion 
or Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the federal constitution when it 
determined that bona fide religious use of peyote is exempt under state law only for Indian-
ancestried NAC members? 
The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law reviewed on appeal for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, K 11, 
452 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. The Court resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. 
See Whitmer v. City ofLindon, 943 P.2d 226, 228 (Utah 1997). 
three counts involving the criminal enterprise (R. 5-1). The State dismissed two of the 
twelve racketeering counts at the preliminary hearing, leaving defendants facing ten 
counts of racketeering (R. 182). 
2 
3. Should this Court reach the merits of defendants' challenge to the trial court's 
determination that bona fide religious use of peyote is exempt under state law only for 
Indian-ancestried NAC members and that the exemption does not violate defendants' state 
constitutional rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and equal operation of 
the laws where defendants failed to adequately raise these issues below? 
No standard of review applies to this issue because defendant failed to properly raise 
the issue in the trial court, thereby preventing its presentation on appeal. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant state and federal statutes are attached as noted: 
In Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3 (1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1999); 
21 U.S.C. §812(1994). 
In Addendum C: In Addendum D: 
21 C.F.R. § 1307.31. 42 U.S.C. 1996; 
42 U.S.C. 1996a. 
The following federal constitutional provisions are also relevant to this 
interlocutory appeal: 
United States Constitution, amend. I: 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
3 
United States Constitution, amend. XIV: 
Section 1. 
[Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection,] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal. Defendants have not been convicted on the charged 
offenses and retain the presumption of innocence. 
Defendants James and Linda Mooney and the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American 
Church of Utah were charged by information with one count of engaging in a pattern of 
unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 
(1999), and twelve counts of engaging in a "controlled substance criminal enterprise," all 
first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (1998) (R. 5-1).2 
The charges arose from defendants' conduct in acquiring, disseminating, and using peyote 
in conjunction with the operation of the church (id.). 
On May 16, 2001, defendants filed a motion to dismiss with a supporting 
memorandum, arguing that their conduct was not punishable under Utah law because their 
activities were limited to members of a Native American church and, hence, fell within a 
2Of the first degree felony charges, defendant James Mooney was named in all 
twelve counts; his wife was named in three of those counts; and the church was named in 
the remaining nine counts (R. 5-1). 
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statutory exception to the criminal use of peyote (R. 269, 175-13). At the beginning of the 
preliminary hearing on May 17,2001, the district judge and the prosecutor noted that because 
they had just received their respective copies of the motion, they were not prepared to 
address it (R. 287: 6-12). Consequently, the preliminary hearing went forward, and further 
briefing and argument was set on defendants' motion (id.). 
After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss (R. 
269-62) (in Addendum B). The judge ruled that, while Utah law provided for an exception 
for the use of peyote in bona fide religious services related to members of any Native 
American church, the exception encompassed only those individuals who had ancestral ties 
to a federally-recognized Indian tribe (id.). The court concluded that because it had been 
presented with no credible proof that either the defendants or those to whom they provided 
peyote were Indian-ancestried, defendants' conduct did not fall within the recognized 
exception (id.). Add. B. 
Defendants timely sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the lower 
court's decision denying the motion to dismiss, and this Court granted that motion and 
accepted the interlocutory petition on October 3, 2001 (R. 273). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS3 
Oklevueha Earthwalk Native American Church ["OENAC"] was established by James 
Mooney in the home he shared with Linda Mooney in Benjamin, Utah (R. 245: R. 287: 18-
3The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing testimony and the trial court's 
ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss. 
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21, 29-32, 37-38, 41, 48, 56, 94-95). Throughout the period charged in the information, 
defendants repeatedly and regularly met with groups averaging between four and thirty 
people (R. 287: 21-23, 32, 39-40, 48, 58, 65, 73, 81, 89). The meetings took place at 
defendants' home, and those in attendance were offered peyote during the meetings (R. 287: 
18-21,23-24,29-33,37-38,41,47-48,52-53,56, 59,62-63,65-66,71-72,74,78-79,81,83, 
87, 89-90, 94-95). 
The State called ten people who had attended one or more such meetings to testify at 
the preliminary hearing. The members found out about the meetings largely from friends, 
family members, or associates—only one of whom was identified as being Indian—or simply 
knew of them through "common knowledge" (R. 287: 33,48-49, 52, 58-59, 72, 74, 89,93). 
Peyote was given to all who wanted it, even those attending for their first time (R. 287: 47-
48, 52-54, 23-24, 29-31, 33, 47-48, 52-53, 59, 62-63, 65-66, 71-72, 74, 78-79, 81, 83, 87, 
89).4 Indian ancestry of any kind was not a prerequisite to attending or participating in 
ceremonies, as none of the ten who testified were shown to be of Indian descent (R. 287: 25, 
34, 42, 75, 84, 90). In fact, when asked if he was enrolled as a member of any Indian tribe, 
4The State claims to have information that defendants provided church members 
with "maintenance dosages" of peyote to take with them from the ceremony-a practice 
seemingly considered sacrilegious in the Native American religion and outside any scope 
of the peyote exemption (R. 10). See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (exempting from criminal 
liability the use of peyote by NAC members "in bona fide religious ceremonies"); see 
also Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(recognizing that peyote use in the NAC takes place in a "precisely circumscribed ritual," 
and that use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious"); United States v. Boyil, 11A F. 
Supp. 1333, 1335 (D.N M. 1991) (noting that "It is considered sacrilegious to use peyote 
for nonreligious purposes"). 
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one person said that he was enrolled in "[t]he tribe here today ran by James Mooney" (R. 
287: 53, 59). Another confessed, "I don't know what that exactly means. I have a card that 
identifies me of Oklevu[e]ha Earthwalks Native American Church" (R. 287: 66). When 
asked about any other tribal affiliation, the witness said he had none (id.). 
Participants were not required to accept the OENAC religious philosophies to the 
exclusion of any other religious beliefs (R. 287: 74, 76, 53, 59, 66, 25, 34, 42, 75, 84, 90). 
In fact, the Mooneys had established another organization called Earth Medicine Foundation 
"primarily to assist individuals who had positive experiences with the church and wished to 
make donations to the church but were inclined to want to make another donation outside of 
their own religion" (R. 287: 102). Defendants intended to use those donations "to purchase 
sacred Peyote lands in Texas and then to hold those lands in trust" (id.).5 
defendants claim the existence of extensive "undisputed" facts which were not 
found by the trial court and urge their adoption by this Court. Br. of Aplts. at 12-13, n.4. 
These include that OENAC has, at all times, been recognized as a bona fide Native 
American Church, that defendant James Mooney was legally authorized to obtain peyote 
in Texas pursuant to authority from the Texas Department of Public Services, and that 
defendant James Mooney is of Indian ancestry. Id. at 13-15. These claims were not 
litigated below but stem from self-serving defense affidavits (R. 246-37). The document 
adduced in support of his claim of authority to obtain peyote is Texas establishes only 
that as of August 2000, the Texas authorities had the name and address of defendant 
OENAC, the name of a contact person, and had received correspondence from the 
church—it does not establish the validity of the church or defendant Mooney's authority 
to obtain peyote (R. 136). The claimed "facts" were not entirely credible in the opinion 
of the trial judge, who noted that defendants recited no facts in their opening 
memorandum in support of their motion, that defendants failed to take issue with the facts 
recited in the State's written response, and that defendant James Mooney's affidavit-
based claims of Indian ancestry were not "official evidence . . . to show that the 
Defendants are legitimately of Indian heritage . . ." (R. 262-63; R. 286: 3). 
The State therefore reserves the right to dispute the validity of defendants' claimed 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Defendants' distribution of peyote to non-Indian members of OENAC is not 
exempted from criminal prosecution under Utah's statutes prohibiting the possession and use 
of peyote. Although Utah law incorporates the Federal Controlled Substances Act, it does 
not incorporate the regulatory provision which provides that the Act "does not apply to the 
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church[.]" 
21C.F.R. § 1307.31. 
Even assuming incorporation of the regulatory exemption into Utah law, defendants' 
conduct remains illegal because the exemption does not extend to the possession and use of 
peyote by non-Indians. Both Congress and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
(the agency which promulgated the federal peyote exemption) interpret the term "Native 
American Church" as including only Indians. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
Amendments, enacted twenty-five years after the regulatory peyote exemption, make clear 
that the government has established a peyote exemption that extends only to Indian members 
of the Native American Church who are affiliated with a federally-recognized tribe. 
Comments made on behalf of Congress and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
at the time each of the two exemptions was enacted demonstrate that the peyote exemption 
was always intended to apply only to that particular group of Indians. Federal case law 
reaffirms that intent. Nothing in Utah's laws suggest that, to the extent the regulatory 
"established" facts should these issues ultimately become determinative of this case. For 
purposes of this appeal only, the State assumes the NAC status of defendant church. 
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exemption was incorporated, it was to be given any broader interpretation than that provided 
by the federal government. Hence, defendants' conduct in distributing peyote to non-Indian 
members of OENAC does not fall within the scope of the peyote exemption at issue, 
permitting their criminal prosecution under state law. 
Point II: The trial court properly rejected defendants' claim that limiting the peyote 
exemption to Indians associated with federally-recognized tribes violates the federal Equal 
Protection provision and the First Amendment freedom of religion clause. Because the 
exemption constitutes a federal regulation concerning Indian affairs, it is reviewed under a 
"rational relationship" analysis, not the "strict scrutiny" test normally applied to an Equal 
Protection challenge. The government possesses a unique duty and responsibility to legislate 
on behalf of Indians that arises from a history of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-
ward" status between the two groups. So long as the government legislates on behalf of 
members of federally-recognized tribes, it is seen as professing a "political" preference, not 
a "racial" one. So long as the legislated preference can be rationally tied to the fulfillment 
of the unique obligation held by the government, the legislation will not be disturbed as an 
unconstitutional preference. 
Neither does the regulatory exemption in this case violate the defendants' freedom of 
religion rights under the First Amendment. The application of the exemption to Indians is 
the least restrictive means of serving the government's valid compelling interests of (1) 
protecting tribal Native Americans and preserving their culture and self-government, and (2) 
protecting society from illegal drug use. Both interests are served by exempting from 
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criminal prosecution only those to whom the government's duty is owed. This permits 
accepted use of the scheduled drug by the smallest number of acceptable individuals possible 
while still permitting the government to meet its unique and special duty toward those 
individuals. Defendants have not established any similar duty owing by the government to 
non-Indians. Further, defendants' extension of the exception to anyone who attends a Native 
American Church impairs both compelling interests because it drastically increases the 
number of individuals who may legally use the dangerous drug and creates the possibility of 
abuse by those joining the church for the sole purpose of using peyote. At the same time, it 
does nothing to further the government's ability to meet its duty to Indians. Consequently, 
the trial court's application of the regulatory peyote exemption to Indians alone violates 
neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendments. 
Point HI: This Court should decline to review defendants' state constitutional claims 
because they were not properly preserved below. Defendants' brief mention of the state 
constitution in the trial court and inclusion of quotes therefrom in their written memoranda 
did not raise the claims uto a level of consciousness" that permitted the trial judge to consider 
and rule on that basis. Moreover, once the ruling issued without any reference to the state 
constitution, defendants failed to remedy the omission by means of a rehearing, a 
clarification, or an amended ruling. Consequently, this Court should find those claims to be 
unpreserved and should refuse to reach their merits. 
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Further, the failure of defendants to include on appeal claims of plain error or 
exceptional circumstances prevent appellate review of their unpreserved state constitutional 
claims. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
UTAH LAW DOES NOT INCORPORATE THE FEDERAL 
REGULATORY PEYOTE EXEMPTION, BUT EVEN IF IT DOES, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IT DOES NOT 
EXTEND TO EXEMPT DEFENDANTS FROM CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION OF PEYOTE TO 
NON-INDIANS 
Defendants argued below that their possession and distribution of peyote to defendant 
OENAC members are exempt from criminal prosecution under the federal exception found 
in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 and that this exception is incorporated in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii) (R. 171-69, 253-52). The trial court held that to the extent the federal exception 
listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 was applicable to the State, it did not extend to exempt "non-
Indian members of the NAC" from criminal prosecution by the State (R. 267-66). 
Consequently, the court determined that "the protection from prosecution of non-Indians, 
regardless of whether they are members of the NAC, is not a 'specific exception' within the 
meaning of § 58-37-4" (id.). 
Because the trial court interpreted the C.F.R. as excluding non-Indians, the peyote 
exemption did not permit defendants to legally distribute peyote to their non-Indian 
members. Add. B. Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court's ruling is contrary both 
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to the plain language of the C.F.R. as well as to the history and tradition of the Native 
American Church "as it bears on the legislative history of the federal exception[.]" Br. of 
Aplts. at 23-34. They conclude with the claim that the lower court's decision should be 
reversed "[i]n the absence of any legislative history indicating that the Utah Legislature 
intended the statutory exemption" to be read as the trial court interpreted it. Id. at 34. The 
following background information should aid in understanding the issue on appeal. 
A. Relevant State And Federal Law 
1. Utah law and the federal peyote exemption 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) prohibits possession of controlled substances 
(attached in Addendum A). A controlled substance is defined as all substances listed in 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 or in the federal Controlled Substances Act ["CSA"] at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801 et seq. (both attached in Addendum A). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3 (attached in 
Addendum A). Peyote is specifically listed as a controlled substance in Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(Q), which sets out the various schedules of controlled substances and 
provides that the listed substances are deemed to be controlled substances "[u]nless 
specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule . . . . " Add. A. The CSA, enacted 
in 1970, conditionally lists peyote in schedule I. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (1994). Add. A. 
Schedule I reflects findings that the drugs listed therein, including peyote, have "a high 
potential for abuse,'* "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," 
and "a lack of accepted safety for use of [the drugs] under medical supervision." 21 U.S.C. 
§ 812(b)(1). Add. A. 
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The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ["BNDD"], the predecessor agency 
to the Drug Enforcement Administration ["DEA"], promulgated regulations to implement 
the CSA. The BNDD promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 in 1965 and presented it to Congress 
in 1970 (attached in Addendum C). The regulation states that "[t]he listing of peyote as a 
controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the Native American 
Church so using peyote are exempt from registration. . . . " 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31. Add. C. 
2. The United States' government's duty to tribes 
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court issued Morton v. Mancari, All U.S. 535 
(1974). In Morton, a group of non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs raised 
a Fifth-Amendment challenge to the agency's hiring preference for Indian employees. Id. 
at 539. The Court rejected the Morton plaintiffs' claim that the preference amounted to 
"invidious racial discrimination." Id. at 553. The Court noted in its opinion "the unique 
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and "the plenary power of Congress, based 
on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf 
of federally recognized Indian tribes." Id. at 551. 
The opinion lists numerous examples of instances in which the United States Supreme 
Court "specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special 
treatment," and it stated that "[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the 
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments 
will not be disturbed." Id. at 554-55. The Court emphasized that it was not sanctioning a 
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"racial" preference where the BIA hiring "preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group 
consisting of 'Indians.... '" Id. at 553, n.24. Instead, the preference was "only to members 
of 'federally recognized' tribes," making the preference "political rather than racial in 
nature." Id. 
3. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
As part of its obligation to legislate on behalf of federally-recognized tribal Indians, 
Congress enacted The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. § 
1996)["AIRFA"] in 1978 (attached in Addendum D).6 AIRFA demonstrates Congress' 
recognition that traditional Native American culture and religion are inseparable. AIRFA 
formalizes a government-wide 
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their 
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional 
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, 
including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred 
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites. 
42 U.S.C. § 1996. Add. D. The preamble to AIRFA reflects Congress' finding that 
The religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskans and 
Hawaiians) are etn integral part of their culture, traditions and heritage, such 
practices forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems. 
See alsoLyngv. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass >z., 485 U.S. 439,454-55 (1988). 
6Generally, Congress has the authority under the Indian Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution, art. I, §2, cl. 3, to legislate on behalf of and for the benefit of 
Indian tribes. Indian tribes are "distinct,. . . political communities" that possess "natural 
rights . . . ." Worchester v. Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
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4. Amendments to AIRFA 
Several years after AIRFA, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Employment Division, Dep 't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
In that case, the two claimants' use of peyote in connection with their membership in a 
Native American Church led to their termination from a drug rehabilitation organization and 
subsequent denial of unemployment compensation. Id, at 872. The United States Supreme 
Court determined that the free exercise clause did not prohibit application of an Oregon law 
drug law that was found to proscribe sacramental peyote use, thereby permitting the state to 
deny the claimants unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on their 
peyote use. Id. at 890.7 The Smith Court reiterated, however, that the federal government 
has broad legal authority, via legislation and related implementing executive action, to 
protect Indian culture and religion, including Indian use of peyote for religious purposes. Id. 
Smith also held that states could pass generally applicable laws not aimed at promoting or 
restricting religious beliefs that prohibit the religious use of drugs, and that states could, but 
need not, permit an exception for a religious use of the prohibited drugs. Id. at 890. 
In response to Smith, Congress amended AIRFA in 1994, to specifically and expressly 
protect Indian use of peyote for traditional, bona fide Indian religious purposes because such 
protection is rationally tied to the United States' obligation to protect Indian religion, culture, 
7The Court also rejected the claim that, at the least, the government has to show a 
compelling interest in forbidding the religious use of peyote to survive a free exercise 
challenge. 494 U.S. at 882-85. 
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and self-determination. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments, 42 
U.S.C. § 1996a ["AIRFAA"] (attached in Addendum D). In doing so, Congress preempted 
states from regulating in this area. Id. at § 1996a(b)(l). Add. D. AIRFAA provides that 
"[notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of 
peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the 
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the Untied 
States or any State." Id. (emphasis added). Add. D. "Indian" is defined in AIRFAA as "a 
member of an Indian tribe." 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(l). Add. D. 
In drafting the amendments, Congress drew on the trust responsibility described in 
Morton, stating that "for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote 
cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant 
in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures." 42 U.S.C. §1996a(a)(l); see also H.R. Report 
103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C. A.N. 2404 (attached in Addendum D). In a section of the House 
Report discussing the constitutionality of the proposed bill, the Report notes that "[bjecause 
Indians and Indian tribes occupy a sui generis legal status in Federal law under the U.S. 
Constitution and enjoy a special political relationship with the United States Government, 
separate Indian legislation has consistently been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court under the 
legal principles set forth mMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974)." H.R. Report 
103-675,1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404,2410. Add. D. The report also quotes extensively from 
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991). Peyote Way 
involved a church that "subscribes to many tenets similar to those of the NAC" and that had 
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a majority of non-Indian members. Id. at 1213. In Peyote Way, the Fifth Circuit Court 
upheld the exclusion of the non-Indian "peyote" group from protection under the same 
C.F.R. exemption at issue here. Id. at 1213-16. The Court reasoned that the peyote group, 
the Peyote Way Church of God, was not similarly situated with the NAC, and that the 
group's use of peyote was not rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of 
preserving Native American culture. Id. at 1216. The Court noted that 
the federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their 
centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the legitimate 
governmental objective of preserving Native American culture. Such 
preservation is fundamental to the federal government's trust relationship with 
tribal Native Americans. Under Morton, Peyote Way's members are not 
similarly situated to those of the NAC for purposes of cultural preservation and 
thus, the federal government may exempt NAC members from statutes 
prohibiting peyote possession without extending the exemption to Peyote 
Way's membership. 
Id. (emphasis added). Because of Morton, and the fact that the "record conclusively 
demonstrates that NAC membership is limited to Native American members of federally 
recognized tribes," the Court held that the federal government could constitutionally exempt 
NAC members from statutes prohibiting peyote possession without extending that exemption 
to Peyote Way. Id. 
Based largely on the analysis in Peyote Way, the House Report expressed confidence 
"that the granting of a statutory religious exemption for the sacramental use of peyote solely 
by American Indians presents no equal protection or establishment clause problems." H.R. 
Report 103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2411. Add. D. 
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B. The Pevote Exemption Should Not Be Deemed Incorporated Into Utah's Statutes 
Under AIRFAA, the State cannot criminalize peyote use by Indians for bona fide 
religious use. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a; see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-675, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404,2411. Add. D. Defendants essentially ignore AIRFAA, both below and 
on appeal, and the trial court focused primarily on the C.F.R.8 Defendants argue for 
incorporation of the C.F.R. apparently because the narrow exception carved out by AIRFAA 
does not help these defendants. As stated, no evidence presented below showed that the 
members to whom defendants provided peyote were Indian or had any tribal affiliation. 
Defendants focus on the C.F.R. because its language appears to be broader than AIRFAA. 
However, because the exemption should not be deemed incorporated into the Utah 
statute, the "broader" interpretation urged by defendants does not apply here. Utah's statute 
provides that it is illegal to possess any listed controlled substance "[u]nless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another schedule . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4. Add. A. 
Peyote is listed both in Utah's schedule I and in the federal schedule. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-4(2)(A)(III)(Q); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 812. Add. A. Nothing in either law 
"specifically except[s]" peyote. The exception defendants argue for exists in a federal 
administrative regulation which is not binding on State courts. Cf. Batterton v. Francis, 432 
AIRFAA is necessary to this appeal as it represents, through its language and 
legislative history, a clear demonstration of congressional and BNDD/DEA intent behind 
the C.F.R. at issue. See Point I, infra. It also demonstrates Congress' understanding of 
the government's duty to legislate only on behalf of Indians who are members of 
federally-recognized tribes in order to avoid constitutional conflicts. 
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U.S. 416, 424 (1977) (federal courts need not give administrative regulations controlling 
weight). Hence, the plain statutory language does not provide for incorporation of the C.F.R. 
peyote exemption, leaving untouched Utah's prohibition against peyote use by anyone except 
those covered by AIRFAA. 
C. Even Assuming Incorporation. The Exemption Does Not Encompass The Use Of 
Peyote By Non-Indians, Permitting The Instant Prosecution For Distribution To 
Non-Indians 
Even assuming incorporation of the exemption, it would not prevent the instant 
prosecution because the exemption does not read any broader than AIRFAA and, hence, does 
not apply to the religious use of peyote by non-Indians. 
By its terms, the federal exemption applies "to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and [to] members of the Native 
American Church[.]" 21 C.F.R. §1307.31. Add. C. Defendants argue that the plain 
language of this exemption, the absence of any qualifying language in Utah's statute, and the 
determination by Chief Judge Buciaga from the New Mexico federal district court that Native 
American Churches have historically opened their doors to non-Indians, combine to require 
that the peyote exemption applies to any and all members of any Native American church. 
Br. of Aplts. at 23-34. The question then is whether members of the Native American 
Church, as used in the C.F.R., includes non-Indians.9 
defendants argue that they have established themselves as a valid NAC. Br. of 
Aplts. at 13-14, 18-19. However, there has been no litigation in this case to date to 
establish a definition of NAC or to determine whether defendants fit within it, not only 
because the motion to dismiss was addressed only after the preliminary hearing and was 
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1. BNDD/DEA and Congress 
Defendants argue that the Utah legislature's intent dictates the scope of the C.F.R.'s 
exemption. Br. of Aplts. at 27-29. However, the legislature simply incorporated the 
Controlled Substances Act without any language suggesting that the federal Act or any 
enabling regulations was to be interpreted any differently than it is applied by the federal 
government. Moreover, because defendants rely on a federal exemption, they should be 
bound by the federal interpretation of that exemption. 
"It is well established 'that an agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled 
to substantial deference.'" Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm 'n, 499 
U.S. 144,150 (1991) (quoting Lyng, 476 U.S. at 939). Where "'the meaning of [regulatory] 
language is not free from doubt,' the reviewing court should give effect to the agency's 
interpretation so long as it is 'reasonable,' Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99,105,91 S.Ct. 
1319, 1323,28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971), that is, so long as the interpretation 'sensibly conforms 
to the purpose and wording of the regulations.'" Martin, 499 U.S. at 150-51 (quoting 
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of 
America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12,15(1975)). Because the definition of "Native American Church" 
in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is not entirely free from doubt, attention must turn to evidence of the 
intent behind the regulation. 
submitted without an evidentiary hearing, but also because the prosecutor did not need to 
litigate the issue because he can prevail on the charges by establishing that defendants 
distributed peyote to non-Indians, regardless of the validity of the church. Moreover, the 
issue is the intent behind the C.F.R., not the definition to be established by this trial court. 
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Both Congress and the BNDD, the agency which promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, 
interpret the term "Native American Church" as including only Indians. This is evident by 
the fact that when the House Subcommittee on Native American Affairs held hearings on 
AIRFAA in 1994, the DEA provided a statement for the record relating to the C.F.R. at issue 
in this case. Gene R. Haislip, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the DEA's Office of 
Diversion Control, remarked that: 
Almost 25 years ago when Congress began hearings pertaining to the 
Controlled Substances Act (CS A) they decided that the traditional, historic use 
of peyote by members of the Native American Church (NAC) as a sacrament 
in traditional religious ceremonies warranted a specific exemption. Congress 
determined, to be consistent with past Federal practice, this exemption should 
be specified in regulation rather than in law. Consequently, an exception was 
created for the NA C to use peyote for religious purposes. A Ithough the NAC 
is not defined in the subject regulations, the members of this church are 
required to be Native American. 
H.R. Report 103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2415 (emphasis added). Add. D. In expressing 
qualified support for the proposed legislation, Mr. Haislip also noted that "[although we at 
DEA feel that the regulation that has been in place for almost 25 years has worked well, we 
would prefer a statutory exemption over an administrative exemption." H.R. Report 103-
675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2416. Add. D. Congressional Representative Bill Richardson 
voiced the same belief in introducing AIRFAA. He stated that the proposed law would 
"make statutory the protection now provided by Federal regulation and the laws of 28 States 
for the religious use of peyote by Indian practitioners." 140 Cong. Rec. E686-03,1994 WL 
132859. The quoted comments make it clear that both Congress and the DEA viewed the 
new law as a statutory version of the existing regulation and contemplated that both made 
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an exception only for Indians. Had either Congress or the DEA interpreted the earlier 
regulation to apply to both non-Indian and Indian church members, as do defendants, the 
enactment of the statutory exemption in AIRFAA-which expressly extends only to members 
of Indian tribes-would have marked a significant departure from the regulatory policy, 
contrary to the quoted comments. See also United States v. Boyll, 11A F. Supp. 1333, 1335 
(D.N.M. 1991) ("The United States adopts a racially restrictive reading of 21 C.F.R. § 
1307.31, arguing that the protection contained therein applies only to members of the Native 
American Church who are American Indians.") 
2. Federal courts9 interpretation 
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit Court examined the ethnic makeup of the NAC, stating, "We 
must look to the evidence to determine whether NAC membership presupposes tribal 
affiliation and Native American ancestry, and thus effects a political classification under 
Morton." Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991). 
The court then found "that the record conclusively demonstrates that NAC membership is 
limited to Native American members of federally recognized tribes who have at least 25% 
Native American ancestry, and therefore represents a political classification." Id. at 1216. 
See also Morton, 417 U.S. at 559 n.24; United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 600 
(D.N.D. 1989); State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950, 951 (1973), cert, 
denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974) (recognizing that the NAC is "primarily an 'Indian religion' by 
reason of its origins and in the context that substantially all of its members are American 
Indians"). 
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3. Defendants9 reliance on United States v. Bovll 
Defendants rely on United States v. Boyll, 114 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), to 
support their interpretation of "Native American Church" in the exemption. Br. of Aplts. at 
27,29-34. Boyll was a non-Indian who claimed membership in an NAC and was prosecuted 
for his religious use of peyote. 774 F.Supp. at 1334-35. The district court in Boyll interpreted 
the exemption to encompass all NAC members, regardless of race, and that to hold otherwise 
would be to sanction a racially-biased, unconstitutional regulatory interpretation. Id. at 1336-
39. Boyll represents the sole opinion of a New Mexico federal district judge. It is a unique 
opinion which runs contrary to federal appellate court decisions without recognizing that 
fact. The court made no attempt to reconcile its position with any other court's contrary 
position and, despite professing to look at the history of the church, failed to recognize its 
Native American origins. 
More important, the Boyll judge purported to undertake what he deemed an "essential" 
examination of the history and present structure of the peyote religion, the Native American 
Church, and 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 before rendering his ruling. 774 F. Supp. at 1335. 
However, a close review of the court's opinion reveals that it gave the matter only cursory 
and selective treatment. The court in Boyll did not reach the Morton Equal Protection 
principles that control disposition of defendants' equal protection claim here. 
The court's selective analysis is readily seen in its reference to the testimony of an 
official from the BNDD at a hearing in 1970. The Boyll court quoted the following passage 
in support of its determination that the regulatory peyote exemption was intended to apply 
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to all members of the NAC: "We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis. 
The history and tradition of the church is such that there is no question but that they regard 
peyote as a deity as it were, and we will continue the exemption." 774 F.2d at 1339 
(emphasis by court). 
The full testimony by Mr. Sonnenreich of the BNDD, and the original question posed 
by Congressman Satterfield of Virginia, reveals the opposite intent—that the regulation was 
intended to include only Indians within its protection. 
[By] Mr. Satterfield. I have one other question. I recall when we were 
discussing dangerous drugs a few years ago, the question came up about the 
Native American Church involving Indians in the west who use and have for 
centuries used peyote in connection with religious services. It is my 
understanding that they enjoy an exemption under the current law. 
[By] Mr. Sonnenreich. In the first instance, Mr. Satterfield, the Native 
American Church did ask us by letter as to whether or not the regulation, 
exempting them by regulation, would be continued and we assured them it 
would be because of the history of the church. We presently are involved in 
another hearing regarding another church that is a non-Indian church that is 
seeking the exemption and the order is going to be published[J I believe, 
either today or tomorrow denying them the same exemption as the Native 
American Church. We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis. 
The history and tradition of the church is such that there is no question but 
that they regard peyote as a deity as it were, and we will continue the 
exemption. 
[By] Mr. Satterfield. You do not see anything in the Senate bill that would 
make this impossible? 
[By] Mr. Sonnenreich. No. Under the existing law originally the Congress was 
going to write in a specific exemption but it was then decided that it would be 
handled by regulation and we intend to do it the same way under this law. 
[By] Mr. Satterfield. Thank you. I have no other questions. 
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Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1970, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public 
Health & Welfare of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 117-18 (1970) (emphasis added). 
The foregoing exchange evinces a clear intent on the part of both the DEA and 
Congress at the time the CSA was enacted to deny protective status to non-Indians who 
attempt to use peyote for religious reasons. See also Warner, 595 F.Supp. at 598. 
In addition, Boy 11 preceded Congress' enactment of AIRFAA in 1994, which clarified 
that the peyote exemption has its roots in the unique trust relationship between the federal 
government and Indian tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a. The State has found no federal court 
opinions issued after AIRFAA's enactment which have extended the federal peyote 
exemption to non-Indians. 
Thus, contrary to the Boy 11 court's interpretation, the regulation is not plainly intended 
to include non-Indians within its protection. Instead, as originally conceived and 
implemented in 1965, and as represented to Congress in 1970, it was intended to apply only 
to the bona fide religious use of peyote by tribal Indians. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
REGULATORY EXEMPTION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 
Defendants challenge the federal constitutionality of the trial court's interpretation of 
the C.F.R. under both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment10. Br. of Aplts. at 59-65. Under the 
appropriate tests, the trial court's restriction of the regulatory exemption violates neither 
federal constitutional provision.11 
A. Limiting The Exception To Indians Associated With Federally-Recognized 
Tribes Does Not Violate Federal Equal Protection Provisions 
Defendants contend that the trial court's interpretation of the federal peyote exemption 
subjects similarly-situated members of the NAC to different legal consequences based solely 
on their race and political status, in violation of federal equal protection rights. Br. of Aplts. 
at 60-65. They argue that no justifiable basis exists for extending the exemption to Indian-
1
 defendants' establishment clause argument is presented on appeal as a state 
constitutional argument only. Br. of Aplts. at 37-38. Defendants made no federal 
establishment clause argument below and present none on appeal. 
llThe State has renumbered the issues raised in defendants' brief, presenting in 
Point II its response to defendants' federal constitutional claims set forth in Point III of 
defendants' opening brief. The State has moved its discussion of defendants' state 
constitutional claims to Point III because defendants did not preserve those claims for 
appeal, and the State's waiver argument adds nothing of merit to the claims addressed in 
Points I and II herein. 
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ancestried NAC members tied to federally-recognized tribes while excluding all other NAC 
members from legally practicing their chosen religion. Id. 
The Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, A13 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). The United States Supreme 
Court has explained that "equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative 
classification . . . when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts 
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, All U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Defendants argue that "strict 
scrutiny" applies because the trial court's interpretation of the peyote exemption interferes 
with fundamental religious rights and operates to the disadvantage of a similarly-situated 
suspect class (i.e., "non-Indian members of the Native American Church"). Br. of Aplts. at 
60-65. 
This case represents an exception to the "strict scrutiny" test because the regulation 
of Indian affairs stands in a unique position when subjected to an equal protection analysis. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that equal protection challenges to 
regulations involving Indian affairs are reviewed under a "rational relationship" analysis, not 
under "strict scrutiny." See Morton, 417 U.S. at 554. That test provides that so long as the 
challenged regulation is rationally related to the government's unique duty and responsibility 
toward the Indians, it will not violate equal protection. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 554; Rupert 
v. Director\ US Fish and Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 1992). That duty arises 
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from a history of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-ward" status by the government 
toward tribal Indians. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 552. The Court in Morton explained that to 
apply the normal formalistic reasoning of strict scrutiny would ignore both the history and 
the purposes behind the preference and the unique legal relationship between the federal 
government and tribal Indians. Id. at 550. 
Morton was the BIA case explained in Point I, supra, in which the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment challenge to the BIA's hiring 
preference for Indians, including the plaintiffs' claim that the preference amounted to 
"invidious racial discrimination." Id. at 551. In explaining its decision, the Court took note 
of "the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and of "the plenary power of 
Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to 
legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes." Id. The Court stated that "[a]s 
long as the special treatment [given such Indians] can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be 
disturbed." Id. at 554-55. Because the preference at issue was "not directed towards a 
'racial' group consisting of'Indians'" but rather "only to members of'federally recognized' 
tribes[,]" the Court's holding did not sanction a "racial" preference but a "political" one. Id. 
at 553, n. 24. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would be to effectively erase Title 25 of the 
U.S. Code (dealing with Indian tribes, reservations and tribal Indians living on or near 
reservations), thereby jeopardizing the solemn commitment of the government toward the 
Indians. Id. at 552-53. 
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In other words, Congress may not legislate on behalf of specific religions or specific 
races, even the Indian race; but it may legislate on behalf of those to whom its recognized 
unique responsibilities are owed—i.e., Indians belonging to federally-recognized tribes. In 
that case, congressional acts are deemed "political rather than racial in nature" and will be 
deemed valid. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 555; Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 600-01. The 
exemption at issue here fits within this category. 
Defendants recognize the political distinction in Morton and insist that the distinction 
between members made in this case is racial as opposed to political. Br. of Aplts. at 63-65. 
They claim that while Morton involved "issues of Indian self-government and tribal 
sovereignty," this case involves the "free exercise rights of Native American Indian members 
of the Native American Church." Id. at 64-65.12 Consequently, they contend, the Morton 
analysis is inapplicable. Id. 
Defendants' brief attempt at distinguishing the "factual context" of this case from 
Morton includes a footnote acknowledging that their argument is based, in part, "on a panel 
decision of the Tenth Circuit, In the Matter of Saenz, No. 00-2166 (2001 WL 892631) (10th 
1
 defendants suggest in a footnote that the U.S. Supreme Court has limited Morton 
solely to issues concerning the BIA. Br. of Aplts. at 64-65, n.20 (quoting from Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519-20 (2000)). However, Rice seems to assume the continued 
validity of Morton. While it refers to the Morton exception as "limited," the Rice court 
lists Morton, together with other cases, as establishing the proposition that "Congress may 
fulfill its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to the Indian tribes by enacting 
legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs." Rice, 528 U.S. at 519-20. 
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Cir. 2001).13 Br. of Aplts. at 65, n.21. In that decision, the Tenth Circuit Court determined 
that Saenz was entitled to the return of eagle feathers the government had taken from him. 
That decision has no application here for several reasons. First, Saenz was a Native 
American, albeit from a non-federally-recognized tribe. See United States v. Hardman, 297 
F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2002). In this case, only one of the named defendants has made 
such a claim, although the trial judge found it to be less than credible on the evidence before 
him (R. 245, 269-62). 
Second, Saenz was before the court because of his own use of the eagle feathers in the 
practice of his own religious beliefs. 297 F.3d at 1119-20. Defendants here are charged with 
distributing peyote to non-qualifying church members: none of the OENAC members who 
testified at the preliminary hearing was Native American. Consequently, this matter does not 
involve the rights of only "Native American Indian members of the Native American 
Church[,]" as defendants claim. Br. of Aplts. at 64-65. 
Third, the ultimate holding in Saenz on rehearing was "extremely narrow" and was 
based on statutory grounds alone, permitting the court to avoid the constitutional issues 
raised in that case (free exercise and equal protection). See Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1124, 
uSaenz was subsequently vacated, reheard, and decided by the Tenth Circuit, en 
banc, with two other cases, in United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
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1127-31, 1135-36. Moreover, the statute that served as the basis for the decision, the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ["RFRA"], is not at issue in this case.14 
Finally, it is well-settled that the regulation of the religion practiced by the tribal 
Native Americans to whom the government owes its special duty necessarily involves issues 
of "Indian self-government and tribal sovereignty." Br. of Aplts. at 64-65. As Congress has 
recognized, religion is an integral part of the Indian existence, culture and self-government. 
There is a unique linkage between the religious, cultural, and ceremonial life of Indian people 
and the survival of their communities as separate self-governing people. Indian culture and 
religion are central to tribal community cohesion and the Indian sense of tribal identity, 
political autonomy, and, therefore, the very sovereignty of Indian tribes. See AIRFA 
preamble ("[T]he religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskans and 
l4In ruling in favor of Saenz, the court noted that it was unable to "give weight to 
[the government's] persuasive authority [that 'the regulations at issue are the least 
restrictive means of advancing the government's interests'] . . . given the poorly 
developed record[.]" 297 F.3d at 1131-32. The court then went on to fault the 
government's failure to show that "limiting permits for eagle feathers only to members of 
federally recognized tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's 
interest in preserving eagle populations and protecting Native American culture." Id. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite decision in United States 
v. Antoine, F.3d , 2003 WL 203114 (9th Cir. 2003), disagreeing with the Tenth 
Circuit's analysis. There, the Ninth Circuit determined, on a record "no less extensive" 
than that in Hardman, that RFRA does not require the showing required by the Hardman 
court, and that "the consequences of extending eligibility are predictable from the nature 
of the repository program" at issue. Id. at HN 4. The Court noted that the defendant was 
not excluded from the permit program based on his religion but because he was not a 
member of a recognized tribe, that "there is certainly a rational basis for the [federally-
recognized tribe] membership requirement^" and that "[t]he government has a 
compelling interest in eagle protection that justifies" its allocation decision where any 
"reconfiguration would necessarily restrict someone's free exercise." Id. at HN 6. 
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Hawaiians) are an integral part of their culture, traditions and heritage, such practices 
forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems."); 42 U.S.C. §1996a(a)(l) ("[F]or 
many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious 
sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating 
Indian tribes and cultures."); 42 U.S.C. § 1996(a)(5) (referencing Congressional declarations 
that AIRFAA was enacted because "the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the 
religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and 
cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment"). In 
order to foster Indian self-government and sovereignty, Congress must also protect the 
religious, ceremonial, and cultural lives of those Indians. Without the use of peyote, the 
Indian religion will not survive. See, e.g., Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 601 (recognizing that the 
"use of peyote is necessary to the survival of Indian religion"); Peyote Way Church of God, 
Inc., v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632,637 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (acknowledging the same as set forth 
in ARFRA). 
Moreover, federal courts have found Morton principles to be applicable in the area of 
religion. See Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34-35; Peyote Way Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1216; 
United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d497, 513 (1st Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); 
McBride v. Shawnee County, Kansas Court Services, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1102-03 (D. Kan. 
1999) (discussing a state-law peyote exemption and noting that Native American religion 
"allows Native Americans to bond spiritually and encourages a sense of community, which 
is essential to tribal self-government" and "cultural integrity"); Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 601 
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('The United States is following the policy of preserving the Indians' dependent nation and 
culture by granting an exemption to Indians for the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies 
oftheNAC"). 
The court in Rupert explained why the rational basis analysis applied to an Indian-
related law involving Indian tribes' religious use of bald eagle feathers: 
In a series of equal protection cases involving laws attacked as treating 
Native Americans in ways that created racial classifications, the Supreme 
Court has "repeatedly held that the peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally 
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf when 
rationally related to the Government's 'unique obligation toward the Indians.'" 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass V?., 
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3068 n.20, 61 L.Ed. 2d 823 (1979) 
(emphasis added and citation omitted). See also United States v. Antelope, 430 
U.S. 641, 645-46, 97 S. Ct. 1395, 1398, 51 L.Ed. 2d 701 (1977) (upholding 
federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Native Americans on 
reservations); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,479-81, 96 S. Ct. 1634, 1644-45, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96 
(1976) (striking down state's attempt to tax property and sales on reservation); 
Morton v. Mancari, 411 U.S. at 54,94 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (upholding statute and 
regulation that gave preference to Native Americans in hiring and promotions 
at Bureau of Indian Affairs.) 
The principles affirmed in these cases "point . . . broadly to the 
conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon 
impermissible classifications," United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646, 
97S.Ct. 1395,1399,51 L.Ed.2d701 (1977)), and we therefore see no reason 
not to use the "rational relationship" analysis here, where the government has 
treated Native Americans differently from others in a manner that arguably 
creates a religious classification. 
Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34-35. 
The Fifth Circuit Court in Peyote Way Church of God similarly applied the Morton 
principles to the religious use of peyote. The Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of a non-
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Indian "peyote" group from protection under the exemption, reasoning that the differential 
treatment is attributable to the federal government's "constitutional role as protector of tribal 
Native Americans" and that an exemption for non-Indians is not entitled to any such 
justification. 922 F.2d at 1217. The Court emphasized that "the federal NAC exemption 
allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is 
rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American 
culture. Such preservation is fundamental to the federal government's trust relationship with 
tribal Native Americans." Id. at 1216 (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 535, 554-55). 
Defendants' attempt to distinguish Morton because this case involves religious 
freedom and not a duty to further Indian self-government fails. Br. of Aplts. at 64-65. The 
government's duty to Indians as a political group is the sole reason a peyote exemption can 
exist. The government does not owe any similar duty to these non-Indian defendants. There 
is no evidence that defendants stand to suffer the same potentially cultural devastating effects 
attributable to tribal Indians should they be unable to partake of peyote. 
Morton essentially holds that Congress may legislate for the benefit of the narrow 
group of Indians who are members of a federally-recognized tribe based on the unique duty 
owed by the government to those tribes, without running afoul of the federal constitution. 
It does not permit Congress to regulate the entire religion or to legislate to ensure a religion's 
continued existence merely because it owes a duty to some practitioners of that religion. 
Neither does the fact that peyote is at the core of NAC beliefs and practices alone permit 
Congress to regulate the entire religion. It is the use and importance of peyote in the religion 
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coupled with the overwhelming importance of the religion to the culture and continued 
existence of the federally-recognized tribes to whom the government owes the unique duty 
and responsibility that permits regulation by Congress in this area. 
To read the C.F.R. as broadly as defendant requires would condemn the exemption, 
rendering it unconstitutionally broad in reaching beyond the narrowly identified group 
recognized in Morton and thereafter in AIRFAA to amount to legislation on behalf of an 
entire religion regardless of the Indian affiliation of its members. Defendants' interpretation 
changes the exemption from a permissible law rationally related to the government's unique 
responsibilities toward tribal Indians into a religion-based preference that has no justification, 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Defendants provide no authority permitting 
Congress to regulate the entire NAC as a religion, absent which defendants' claim that the 
scope of the C.F.R. extends beyond those to whom the government's special duty is owed 
is untenable. 
Defendants argue that because the NAC considers peyote to be a deity, the inability 
to legally use peyote prevents all individuals not encompassed within the scope of the peyote 
exception from joining the church. Br. of Aplts. at 39-41. First, there is no evidence that 
non-qualifying individuals cannot be included within the church and benefit from the 
experiences of those who can legally use peyote in the religious ceremonies. Second, 
defendants' concern that the trial court's interpretation of the exemption directly affects 
membership of the NAC does not defeat the government's responsibility to legislate on 
behalf of tribal Indians. Congress has not legislated with the goal of ensuring continuation 
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of the NAC, nor can it. It has legislated to permit tribal Indians to participate in their chosen 
religion if they so choose without risking criminal sanctions. That is as far as their 
responsibility extends. Congress has repeatedly refused to sanction the use of controlled 
substances by other individuals and religions, and to do otherwise in this case for these 
defendants would amount to an unjustifiable religious preference. See, e.g., Peyote Way, 922 
F.2d at 1211-20 (refusing to grant to defendants, worshippers of peyote but not part of the 
Native American Church, the peyote exemption enjoyed by NAC members); Olsen v. Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (denying the Ethiopian 
Zion Coptic Church an exemption for their use of marijuana which would be similar to the 
exemption utilized by the NAC); McBride, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (refusing relief to a 
religious order centered on marijuana who sought the same treatment as the NAC and their 
use of peyote). 
Under federal law, therefore, the trial court's determination that the preference given 
to tribal Indian NAC members is "clearly not racial in nature, but political" is correct (R. 
265). Given the importance and integral nature of Indian religion to Indian life and self-
government, and the importance and integral nature of peyote (a deity) to Indian religion {see 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1996 & 1996a), the special and particular treatment given Indians in the form 
of the peyote exemption should not be disturbed, but should be deemed rationally tied to the 
fulfillment of the government's unique obligation toward the Indians. Hence, defendants' 
federal equal protection challenge fails. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 554-55 ("As long as the 
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special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation 
toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed."). 
Thus, as the trial court recognized, the proper test is the "rational relationship" test. 
The trial court correctly found that "the preference given to Indians in the application of 21 
C.F.R. § 1307.31 is tied rationally to the fulfillment of the State's unique obligation toward 
the Indians and does not violate Defendants' rights to equal protection" (R. 265). 
B. Limitation Of The Peyote Exemption To NAC Members Associated With 
Federally-Recognized Tribes Does Not Violate The First Amendment Freedom 
Of Religion Clause 
Defendants claim that their possession and distribution of peyote in conjunction with 
bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC is an activity protected in its entirety under the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Br. of Aplts. at 59-60. They contend that they 
established below that, to the members of the OENAC, "the worship of peyote as a deity and 
sacrament is the heart" of their religious worship.15 Id. at 39. Thus, defendants claim, the 
trial court's ruling that only Indian members of a federally-recognized tribe escape criminal 
liability for religious use of peyote necessarily burdens the remaining members' free exercise 
of their religious beliefs. Id. at 39-40. They argue that the broad language of the C.F.R. 
permitting peyote use by members of the NAC evidences an overriding compelling interest 
in protecting the free exercise of religion for all members of the NAC, irrespective of tribal 
membership. They assert that the State has failed to prove that religion-related use of peyote 
15Again, this claim is based solely on defendants' self-serving affidavits and 
involves a fact on which the trial court has not yet ruled. See footnote 5, supra. 
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by non-Indian NAC members and by Indian members without a federally-recognized tribal 
affiliation poses more of a threat to public health, safety, and welfare than the religious use 
of peyote by those NAC members included within the trial court's ruling. Id. at 44-45. In 
other words, defendants contend that the State failed to prove that the trial court's 
interpretation of the C.F.R. was the least restrictive means of achieving any compelling 
interest of the State. Id. at 60. 
"When presented with a constitutional challenge to a law, [the appellate court] 
presume[s] the law is valid." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1248 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, 
526 U.S. 1130 (1999). "A party mounting such a challenge bears a heavy burden to 
overcome this presumption, and "'we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Id. (quoting Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1997) 
(additional quotations omitted)). 
Traditionally, an inroad on religious liberty may be justified under the Free Exercise 
Clause upon a showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling 
governmental interest. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981); see also Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of 
the Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1186 (Utah 1993). Defendants advocate, and 
the trial court used, this traditional "compelling interest" test, which requires a determination 
of whether the government's action in fact creates a burden on the Defendants' religion and, 
if so, whether there is a compelling reason for the government's action. Id. at 47-48, 59-60. 
It also requires a showing that the governmental action is the least restrictive means of 
38 
accomplishing the desired end (R. 266). Br. of Aplts. at 42-43,59-60; see also Thomas, 450 
U.S. at 718; Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 599. 
Recent United States Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause cases impose a less rigid 
test and provide that "a state law that incidentally burdens the exercise of religion is not 
unconstitutional so long as the law is not intended to burden free exercise, is of generally 
applicability, and is otherwise valid." Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1249. In Employment Div. Dept. of 
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the United States Supreme Court stated that it 
had "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. at 878-79, 
reh g denied 495 U.S. 913 (1990). The Court noted its consistent rulings "that the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ' valid and 
neutral law of generally applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) [.]'" Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 253 n.3 (1982)). 
While the less rigorous test of Smith appears to apply to this case, this Court need not 
decide the issue because defendants' argument fails even under the more rigorous compelling 
state interest test. 
There are two valid compelling interests behind the challenged exemption in this case. 
First is the State's and the federal government's legitimate and compelling interest "in 
protecting society from illegal drug use," including the use of peyote by non-exempted 
individuals (R. 266-65). The other is the government's "constitutional role as protector of 
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tribal Native Americans" and its trust relationship with tribal Native Americans that requires 
the government's active participation in preserving the Native American culture and self-
government. See Peyote Way Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1216-17; see also Mancari, 417 
U.S. at 535, 554-55. 
The main objective of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 is to comprehensively 
deal with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-
1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4566,4567. 
See also Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598-99. The CSA evinces Congress' intent to protect the 
American public from the obvious dangers of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). The CSA lists 
peyote as a Schedule I drug, making no distinction between or comparison of the relative 
dangers of peyote versus any other listed drug. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c). Under the framework 
of the CSA, the placement of peyote in Schedule I reflects that peyote "has a high potential 
for abuse," that peyote "has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States," and that "[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of [peyote] under medical 
supervision." 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see also Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598. At a minimum, 
it reflects that peyote may present a substantial and detrimental effect to the health and 
general welfare of the American public. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). Nothing in the CSA 
suggests that peyote is worthy of any lesser concern than any other drug listed in the 
schedules. Utah's statute also lists peyote as a Schedule I drug, reflecting the State's 
agreement that peyote poses a substantial threat to the public and should be regulated. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(Q). 
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Congress' compelling interest in controlling the use of dangerous drugs has been 
widely recognized and does not lessen even when the drugs are used for religious purposes. 
See Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 599; United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir. 
1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (citing United States v. Hudson, 431 F.2d 468,469 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971) (the use of drugs as part of religious 
practice is not constitutionally privileged)). Utah's interest in controlling the use of Schedule 
1 drugs is no less compelling, especially where the language of our relevant criminal statutes 
echoes the federal prohibitions and named drugs. 
The existence of the exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 does not lessen that 
compelling interest. The language of the exemption itself demonstrates that Congress did 
not intend to grant a broad exemption for the religious use of peyote to everyone, but instead 
sought to limit the exemption only to Indians. Also, BNDD officials expressly informed 
Congress that the administrative exemption applied only to the NAC and that they were 
about to deny an exemption to a non-Indian church because of the absence from that church's 
background of the same unique history and tradition regarding peyote use that existed behind 
the NAC. See Hearings on H.R. 11701 and H.R. 13743 before the Subcomm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce 117-18 (1970); see also Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598. 
The government's interest in meeting its trust relationship with tribal Native 
Americans is equally compelling. See generally subpoint IIIA, supra; see also Peyote Way 
Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1216 ("[T]he federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native 
Americans to continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the 
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legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American culture. Such 
preservation is fundamental to the federal government's trust relationship with tribal Native 
Americans.") (quoting Morton, All U.S. at 535, 554-55). No such relationship or trust 
responsibility exists between the government and non-Indians or Indians having no affiliation 
with a federally-recognized tribe. As stated, none of the members of the OENAC who 
testified at the preliminary hearing were Indian, let alone Indians with a federally-recognized 
tribal affiliation. Some defined their tribal affiliation as the OENAC, evincing the absence 
of the sort of integral relationship between the religious beliefs of the church and the culture 
and definition of the tribal existence for which the government has legislated. Many testified 
that they heard about the meetings, showed up, and were given peyote, suggesting that they 
were not required to subscribe to the sacred beliefs of the church before being allowed to 
become a member of OENAC. These individuals clearly would not suffer the same 
culturally-damaging effects as would tribal Indians if denied the benefit of the peyote 
exemption. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that because of the religious diversity in America, 
religious accommodations must vary in kind and degree. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984), reh 'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984). Religious accommodations need not be equal if 
there are "neutral, secular reasons," not based on religious favoritism, for distinguishing 
among religions. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Buddhist prisoner denied equal 
treatment in terms of chapel access and religious instruction); Gillette v. United States, 401 
U.S. 437,458 (1971) (upholding a law exempting religious conscientious objectors from all 
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war but not those who object to only some wars), reh g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). The 
same may be said of distinguishing among practitioners of a single religion. 
The NAC exemption for the religious use of peyote meets this test. As explained, 
Congress' interest behind the exemption is not in guarding and perpetuating the religion 
practiced by the NAC by ensuring a broad membership base, but in perpetuating the ability 
of Indians affiliated with a federally-recognized tribe to practice their chosen religion, which 
religion is integral to their existence, their self-government, and their tribal identity. As the 
exemption advances the neutral, secular objective of preserving Native American culture, it 
is not based on religious favoritism. Because there are valid, neutral and secular reasons for 
Congress' and the Executive Branch's accommodation of the religious use of peyote by tribal 
members of the NAC, the singling out of tribal Indians for special treatment is proper and 
constitutionally permissible pursuant to the United States' responsibility to protect Indian 
culture and self-determination 
In light of the dual compelling interests in this case, the trial court's reading of the 
exemption is the least restrictive means of achieving the required balance between the 
interests. The State is not free to restrict the reading of the exemption in light of AIRFAA, 
which preempts the States from criminalizing the religious use of peyote by Indians affiliated 
with a federally-recognized tribe. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a. Add. D. Even if a more restrictive 
reading were possible, it would better serve the government's interest in protecting society, 
but would defeat the government's responsibility toward federally-recognized tribes. 
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Without access to the lawful use of peyote, the established deity of the religion, the religion 
would not survive, and an integral part of the Indian culture and identity would cease to exist. 
On the other hand, broadening the exemption to include Indian NAC members who 
enjoy no affiliation with a federally-recognized tribe would do nothing to further the 
government's responsibilities toward tribal Indians, and would lessen the government's 
protection of the public from dangerous drug use by allowing more individuals to use peyote. 
In any event, such a reading would be of no consequence in this case because defendants 
have been charged with the distribution of peyote to individuals who, from the present 
record, are non-Indians. 
To broaden the exemption even more to include non-Indian NAC members would also 
do nothing to achieve the government's purpose of furthering its solemn commitment toward 
tribal Indians. At the same time, it would lessen even more the State's ability to protect the 
public from use and possible misuse of a Schedule I drug by permitting its lawful use by a 
larger number of people in the name of protecting a particular religion. With no compelling 
reason for the broader interpretation, this result rings of religious favoritism and should be 
rejected. 
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POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANTS' 
UNPRESERVED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
BECAUSE THEY NEITHER RAISED THEM BELOW NOR ARGUE 
ANY EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION RULE ON APPEAL 
The majority of defendants' appellate brief is devoted to claiming that the trial court 
erred in not including in its ruling any mention of the alleged violation of defendants' rights 
under the state constitution. Br. of Aplts. at 35-59. Specifically, they claim violation of: the 
religion-related provisions of Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1; the 
uniform operations of laws provision of Article I, section 24; and the due process provision 
of Article I, section 7.16 Id. This Court should decline to review defendants' state 
constitutional claims because they did not adequately raise them below, and they do not 
argue any exception to the preservation rule on appeal. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 
313, 318 (Utah 1998)); see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, U 13, 61 P.3d 1062. "[T]he 
preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions." Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, at K 11 (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). For an issue 
to be preserved for appeal, "'the record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the 
1
 defendants include a reference to their federal due process rights in arguing that 
the statute should be deemed violative of their due process rights because it is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to them. Br. of Aplts. at 56-59. The 
State's waiver argument applies to this claim as well inasmuch as defendant raised no 
discernable due process argument below. 
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trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon.'" Hansen, 2002 UT 114, 1j 13 
(quoting Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 984 n.2 (Utah 1988)); see also 
Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^  14, 48 P.3d 968. 
"The 'mere mention' [to the trial court] of an issue without introducing supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal Rather, "'for 
an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of 
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 
(UtahApp. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 13 (for the trial court 
to have an opportunity to rule: "'(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue 
must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority.'") (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847)(Utah 1998). 
In this case, defendants mentioned the state constitution below, but they did not raise 
the issue "to a level of consciousness" that permitted the trial judge to consider it. In their 
opening memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, defendants briefly mentioned the 
state constitution only in the first argument (R. 170-69) (attached in Addendum E). After 
arguing that the state statute incorporates the federal peyote exemption, defendants baldly 
claimed that their argument was "consistent with the guarantees of religious freedom 
proclaimed in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah " (R. 171-70). 
Add. E. They then included a block quote from that section of the state constitution, and 
followed it with two sentences: 
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The foregoing Utah constitution provision implements the mandate in 
the Utah Enabling Act, that "Perfect tolerance of religious sentiment shall be 
secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person 
or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship." Additionally, 
Article I, Section I of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right of Utah 
residents "to worship according to the dictates of their own consciences" and 
Article III provides for "perfect toleration of religious sentiment and 
unmolested religious worship." 
(R. 169). Add. E. Defendants then ended the argument with a summary claim that the State 
necessarily failed to meet its burden of proof (id.). Add. E. These two paragraphs consisted 
of three sentences relating to the state constitution and a block quote from that constitution. 
They contained no claim of a state constitutional violation, no argument, and no supporting 
authority to alert the trial court that defendants were seriously seeking a decision under the 
state constitution, let alone a decision that would differ from that under the federal 
constitution. No other specific claim or argument pursuant to the state constitution appeared 
in the remainder of the opening memorandum. 
The State's response to this state constitutional reference was: 1) to note that 
defendants cited to the state constitution; and 2) to highlight the absence of any citation to 
supportive authority (R.231). The State consequently urged the use of federal jurisprudence 
to decide the matter (Id.). 
In their reply memorandum, defendants' sole reference to the state constitution was 
under the heading "The Utah Constitution Provides An Independent Basis For Dismissing 
This Prosecution" (R. 248) (attached in Addendum E). The entire section consists of a 
single sentence, free of any citation of authority, summarily stating that the state 
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constitutional provisions cited in the opening memorandum provide equal or broader 
protection than the First Amendment to the federal constitution, and required a favorable 
decision for defendants (id.). Add. E. 
The only mention of due process in either document is in the reply brief, where 
defendants claim "it is a violation of due process" for Utah to grant an exception to NAC 
members for religious use of peyote and to then criminally prosecute defendants for that 
activity (R. 252). Add. E. There is no mention of whether the claim is one under the state 
or the federal constitution, and there is no authority or argument presented to enlighten the 
trial court. 
Nothing more was added by defendants at oral argument. Defense counsel merely 
mentioned the state constitution as follows (R. 286: 14): 
In Utah we have the state constitution, which is even more stringent 
than the federal constitution in protecting the rights of its citizens to worship 
according to the dictates of their own conscience], free from molestation by 
a government. 
Here I think we have a constitutional argument, though I don't think the 
Court has to get to the constitutional arguments in this case, but certainly it 
shows that the State has no compelling interest in prosecuting people who are 
properly and freely exercising their fundamental religious beliefs as members 
of the Native American Church in light of the strong state constitutional 
provisions providing for the full free exercise of religion 
The minimal reference to the state constitution by defendants below amounts to a 
"mere mention" without supporting argument or relevant legal authority. This "mention" is 
insufficient to alert to trial judge to the need to consider the issue, let alone to preserve it for 
appeal. This is demonstrated by the trial court's ruling, which sets forth and addresses 
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defendants' arguments without reference to the state constitution (R. 267-62). Significantly, 
the defendants did not seek to remedy this omission by asking for a rehearing, clarification, 
or an amended ruling addressing a state constitutional claim. Consequently, this Court 
should find that defendants failed to preserve the state constitutional claims for appeal and 
should refuse to reach the merits of those claims. 
An appellant may obtain review of an unpreserved claim by alleging plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Defendants, however, have not alleged plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. This Court should therefore decline to review defendants' unpreserved state 
constitutional claims. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^  71, 55 P.3d 573Utah Adv. Rep. 
25 (declining to review an unpreserved claim where the party failed to argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, ^ f 33,44 P.3d 690 (same); State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / J day of February, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
49 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Kathryn Collard, attorney for appellant, 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / 3 day of February, 2003. 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 6A 
1998 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 58 and 58A 
58-37-3. Substances considered controlled. 
(1) All substances listed in Section 58-37-4 are considered controlled. 
(2) All substances listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, 
PL. 91-513, are considered controlled. 
History: L. 1971, c h . 145, § 3; 1979, c h . 12, 
« 2; 1997, ch . 64, S 3 . 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsections (1) 
and (2) deleted "controlled* following "All" and 
substituted "considered" for "hereby**; made sty-
listic changes in Subsection (2); and deleted 
Subsection (3) relating to substances desig-
nated, rescheduled or deleted as controlled sub-
stances in schedules I through V of the federal 
Controlled Substances Act. 
Federal Law. — The federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act, cited in Subsections (2) and (3), is 
codified primarily as 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. 
58-37-4. Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules 
I through V — Findings required — Specific 
substances included in schedules. 
(1) There are established five schedules of controlled substances known as 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V which shall consist of substances listed in this 
section. 
(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V consist of the following drugs or other 
substances by the official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or 
brand name designated: 
(a) Schedule I: 
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, 
any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, 
salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, when the existence of 
the isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific 
chemical designation: 
(A) Acetyl-alphamethylfentanyl; 
(B) Acetylmethadol; 
(C) Allylprodine; 
(D) Alphacetylmethadol (except levo-alphacetylmethadol also 
known as alpha-acetylmethadol, levomethadyl acetate, or 
LAAM); 
(E) Alphameprodine; 
(F) Alphamethadol; 
(G) Alpha-methiofentanyl; 
(H) Alpha-methylfentanyl; 
(I) Benzethidine; 
(J) Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl; 
(K) Beta-hydroxyfentanyl; 
(L) Betacetylmethadol; 
(M) Betameprodine; 
(N) Betamethadol; 
(O) Betaprodine; 
(P) Cathinone; 
(Q) Clonitazene; 
(R) Dextromoramide; 
(S) Diampromide; 
(T) Diethylthiambutene; 
(U) Difenoxin; 
(V) Dimenoxadol; 
(W) Dimepheptanol; 
(X) Dimethylthiambutene; 
(Y) Dioxaphetyl butyrate; 
(Z) Dipipanone; 
(AA) Ethylmethylthiambutene; 
(BB) Etonitazene; 
(CC) Etoxeridine; 
(DD) Furethidine; 
(EE) Hydroxypethidine; 
(FF) Ketobemidone; 
(GG) Levomoramide; 
(HH) Levophenacylmorphan; 
(II) Methcathinone; 
(JJ) Morpheridine; 
(KK) Mppp (l-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxpipiridine); 
(LL) Noracymethadol; 
(MM) Norlevorphanol; 
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(OO) Norpipanone, 
(PP) Para-fluorofentanyK 
(QQ) PEPAP(l-( 2-phenethyl)-4-phenyl-4-acetoxypiperidine), 
(RR) Phenadoxone, 
(SS) Phenampromide, 
(TT) Phenomorphan, 
(UU) Phenopendme, 
( W ) Pintramide, 
(WW) Proheptazme, 
(XX) Propendme, 
(YY) Propiram, 
(ZZ) Racemoramide, 
(AAA) Thiofentanyl, 
(BBB) Tihdine, 
(CCC) Trimeperidine, 
(DDD) 3-menthylthiofentanyl, and 
(EEE) 3-methylfentanyl 
(n) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and 
salts of isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation 
(A) Acetorphine, 
(B) Acetyldihydrocodeme, 
(C) Benzylmorphine, 
(D) Codeine methylbromide, 
(E) Codeine-N-Oxide, 
(F) Cyprenorphme, 
(G) Desomorphine, 
(H) Dihydromorphine, 
(I) Drotebanol, 
(J) Etorphme (except hydrochloride salt), 
(K) Heroin, 
(L) Hydromorphmol, 
(M) Methyldesorphine, 
(N) Methylhydromorphme, 
(O) Morphine methylbromide, 
(P) Morphine methylsulfonate, 
(Q) Morphme-N-Oxide, 
(R) Myrophine, 
(S) Nicocodeme, 
(T) Nicomorphine, 
(U) Normorphme, 
(V) Pholcodine, and 
(W) Thebacon . 
(111) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed m another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or w n l f n 
contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers when the 
existence of the salts isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within 
the specific chemical designation, as used in this bubsection (in) only, 
"isomer" includes the optical, position, and geometric isomers 
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(A) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine, 
(B) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine, 
(C) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine, 
(D) 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamme (MDMA), 
(E) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine, 
(F) 4-methoxyamphetamine, 
(G) 3,4,5-tnmethoxy amphetamine, 
(H) Bufotenine, 
(I) Diethyltryptamine, 
(J) Dimethyltryptamine, 
(K) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine; 
(L) Ibogame, 
(M) Lysergic acid diethylamide, 
(N) Marijuana, 
(O) Mescaline, 
(P) Parahexyl, 
(Q) Peyote, 
(R) N-ethyl-3-pipendyl benzilate, 
(S) N-methyl-3-pipendyl benzilate, 
(T) Psilocybm; 
(U) Psilocyn, 
(V) Tetrahydrocannabinols, 
(W) Ethylamine analog of phencychdme; 
(X) Pyrrolidine analog of phencychdme, 
(Y) l-l-(2-Thieny) Cyclohexyl Pyrrolidine, and 
(Z) Thiophene analog of phencychdme 
(IV) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed m another sched-
ule, any material compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers 
is possible within the specific chemical designation 
(A) Mecloqualone, and 
(B) Methaqualone 
(v) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system, including their salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers 
(A) Fenethylhne, 
(B) 4-Methylaminorex, and 
(C) N-ethylamphetamme 
(b) Schedule II 
(I) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, 
any of the following substances whether produced directly or indi-
rectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis 
(A) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparation of opium or opiate excluding apomorphine, 
dextrorphan, nalbuphine, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their 
respective salts, but including 
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(I) Raw opium; 
(II) Opium extracts; 
(III) Opium fluid extracts; 
(IV) Powdered opium; 
(V) Granulated opium; 
(VI) Tincture of opium; 
(VII) Codeine; 
(VIII) Ethylmorphine; 
(EX) Etorphine hydrochloride; 
(X) Hydrocodone; 
(XI) Hydromorphone; 
(XII) Metopon; 
(XIII) Morphine; 
(XIV) Oxycodone; 
(XV) Oxymorphone; and 
(XVI) Thebaine; 
(B) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation which is 
chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances 
referred to in Subsection (2XbXiXA), except that these substances 
may not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium; 
(C) Opium poppy and poppy straw; 
(D) Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or prepa-
ration of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparation which is chemically equivalent or identical with any 
of these substances, and includes cocaine, its isomers and salts of 
isomers, whether derived from the coca plant or synthetically 
produced, except the substances may not include decocainized 
coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not 
contain cocaine or ecgonine; and 
(E) Concentrate of poppy straw, which means the crude extract 
of poppy straw in either liquid, solid, or powder form which 
contains the phenanthrine alkaloids of the opium poppy. 
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, 
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, when the 
existence of the isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the 
specific chemical designation, except dextrorphan: 
(A) Alphaprodine; 
(B) Alfentanil; 
(C) Anileridine; 
(D) Bezitramide; 
(E) Bulk dextropropoxyphene (nondosage forms); 
(F) Carfentanil; 
(G) Dihydrocodeine; 
(H) Diphenoxylate; 
(I) Fentanyl; 
(J) Isomethadone; 
(K) Levomethorphan; 
(L) Levo-alphacetylmethadol (some other names: alpha-
acetylmethadol, levomethadyl acetate, or LAAM); 
(M) Levorphanol; 
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' (N) Metazocine; 
(O) Methadone; 
(P) Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 4-
diphenyl butane; 
(Q) Methyl-Fentanyl; 
(R) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholino-l, 1-di-
phenylpropane-carboxylic acid; 
(S) Pethidine (meperidine); 
(T) Pethidine-Intermediate-A, 4-cyano-l-methyl-4-phenyl-
piperidine; 
(U) Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-car-
boxylate; 
(V) Pethidine-Intermediate-C, l-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-
carboxylic acid; 
(W) Phenazocine; 
(X) Piminodine; 
(Y) Racemethorphan; 
(Z) Racemorphan; and 
(AA) Sufentanil, 
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system: 
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its 
optical isomers; 
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its 
isomers; 
(C) Phenmetrazine and its salts; and 
(D) Methylphenidate. 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers 
is possible within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Amobarbital; 
(B) N,N,Dimethylamphetamine; 
(C) Glutethimide; 
(D) Pentobarbital; 
(E) Phencyclidine; 
(F) Phencyclidine immediate precursors: 1-phenyl-cyclc-
hexylamine and 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC); and 
(G) Secobarbital. 
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of Phenylacetone. 
Some of these substances may be known by trade or other names: 
phenyl-2-propanone, P2P; benzyl methyl ketone, methyl benzyl ke-
tone. 
(vi) (A) Dranabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil and encapsulated in a 
soft gelatin capsule in a Fulnal Food and Drug Administration 
approved drug product; and 
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(B) Nabinol. 
(c) Schedule III: 
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule 
any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any 
quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the 
central nervous system, including its salts, isomers whether optical 
position, or geometric, and salts of the isomers when the existence of 
the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific 
chemical designation: 
(A) Those compounds, mixtures, or preparations in dosage unit 
form containing any stimulant substances listed in Schedule II 
which compounds, mixtures, or preparations were listed on 
August 25, 1971, as excepted compounds under Section 308.32 of 
Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and any other drug of 
the quantitive composition shown in that list for those drugs or 
which is the same except that it contains a lesser quanti ty of 
controlled substances; 
(B) Benzphetamine; 
(C) Chlorphentermine; 
(D) Clortermine; 
(E) Mazindol; and 
(F) Phendimetrazine. 
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on 
the central nervous system: 
(A) Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing amo-
barbital, secobarbital, pentobarbital, or any salt of any of them, 
and one or more other active medicinal ingredients which are not 
listed in any schedule; 
(B) Any suppository dosage form containing amobarbital, seco-
barbital, or pentobarbital, or any salt of any of these drugs which 
is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for marketing 
only as a suppository; 
(C) Any substance which contains any quantity of a derivative 
of barbituric acid or any salt of any of them; 
(D) Chorhexadol; 
(E) Lysergic acid; 
(F) Lysergic acid amide; 
(G) Methyprylon; 
(H) Sulfondiethylmethane; 
(I) Sulfonethylmethane; 
(J) Sulfonmethane; and 
(K) Tiletamine and zolazepam or any of their salts, 
(iii) Nalorphine. 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing 
limited quantit ies of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts 
KJI <xny CM t u r i u . 
(A) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or 
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or 
greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium; 
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(B) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or 
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more 
active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic 
amounts; 
(C) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone per 100 
milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with a 
fourfold or greater quanti ty of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium; 
(D) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone per 100 
milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with 
one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized thera-
peutic amounts; 
(E) Not more than 1.8 grams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milli-
liters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or 
more active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic 
amounts; 
(F) Not more than 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 
milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with 
one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized thera-
peutic amounts; 
(G) Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters 
or per 100 grams, or not more than 25 milligrams per dosage unit, 
with one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized 
therapeutic amounts; 
(H) Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine per 100 millili-
ters or per 100 grams with one or more active, non-narcotic 
ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts. 
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, anabolic steroids including any of the following or any isomer, 
ester, salt, or derivative of the following tha t acts in the same manner 
on the human body: 
(A) Clostebol; 
(B) Chorionic gonadotropin; 
(C) Dehydroclormethyltestosterone; 
(D) Ethylestrenol; 
(E) Fluxymesterone; 
(F) Mesterolone; 
(G) Methandrenone; 
(H) Methandrostenolone; 
(I) Methenolone; 
(J) Methyltestosterone, except when combined with esterified 
estrogens; 
(K) Nandrolone decanoate; 
(L) Nandrolone phenpropionate; 
(M) Norethandrolone; 
(N) Oxandrolone; 
(O) Oxymesterone; 
(P) Oxymetholone; 
(Q) Stanozolol: and 
(R) Testosterone propionate. 
Anabolic steroids expressly intended for administration 
through implants to cattle or other nonhuman species, and 
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approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use, may not 
be classified as a controlled substance, 
(d) Schedule IV: 
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, 
any material , compound, mixture, or preparation containing not more 
than 1 milligram of difenoxin and not less than 25 micrograms of 
atropine sulfate per dosage unit, or any salts of any of them; 
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quanti ty of the following substances, including its salts, isomers, 
and salts of isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts 
of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Alprazolam; 
(B) Barbital; 
(C) Bromazepam; 
(D) Camazepam; 
(E) Chloral betaine; 
(F) Chloral hydrate; 
(G) Chlordiazepoxide; 
(H) Clobazam; 
(I) Clonazepam; 
(J) Clorazepate; 
(K) Clonazepam; 
(L) Cloxazolam; 
(M) Delorazepam; 
(N) Diazepam; 
(O) Estazolam; 
(P) Ethchlorvynol; 
(Q) Ethinamate; 
(R) Ethyl loflazepate; 
(S) Fludiazepam; 
(T) Flunitrazepam; 
(U) Flurazepam; 
(V) Halazepam; 
(W) Haloxazolam; 
(X) Ketazolam; 
(Y) Loprazolam; 
(Z) Lorazepam; 
(AA) Mebutamate; 
(BB) Medazepam; 
( C O Medazolam; 
(DD) Methohexital; 
(EE) Meprobamate; 
(FF) Methylphenobarbital (mephobarbital); 
(GG) Nemetazepam; 
(HH) Nitrazepam; 
(II) Nordiazepam; 
(JJ) Oxazepam; 
(KK) Oxazolam; 
(LL) Paraldehyde; 
(MM) Penazepam; 
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(NN) Pentazocine; 
( 0 0 ) Petrichloral; 
(PP) Phenobarbital; 
(QQ) Prazepam; 
(RR) Quazepam; 
(SS) Tempazepam; 
(TT) Tetrazepam; and 
(UU) Treazolam. 
(iii) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation of 
fenfluramine which contains any quantity of the following substances, 
including its salts, isomers whether optical, position, or geometric, 
and salts of the isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and 
salts of isomers is possible. 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers whether 
optical, position, or geometric isomers, and salts of the isomers when 
the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible 
within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Cathine; 
(B) Diethylpropion; 
(C) Fencamfamine; 
(D) Fenproprex; 
(E) Mazidole; 
(F) Mefenorex; 
(G) Phentermine; 
(H) Pemoline, including organometallic complexes and 
chelates thereof; 
(1) Pipradrol; and 
(J) SPA((-)-l-climethylamino-l,2 diphenylethane). 
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of dextropropoxyphene (alpha-(+)-4-dimethylamino-l, 
2-diphenyl-3-methyl-2-propionoxybutane), including its salts, 
(e) Schedule V: Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any 
of the following limited quantities of narcotic drugs, or salts of any of them, 
which includes one or more non-narcotic active medicinal ingredients in 
sufficient proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation 
valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic 
drug alone: 
(i) not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or 
per 100 grams; 
(ii) not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milli-
liters or per 100 grams; 
(iii) not more than 100 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 
milliliters or per 100 grams; 
(iv) not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not less 
than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit; 
(v) not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or per 
100 grams; 
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(vi) not more than 0 5 milligram of difenoxm and not less than 25 
micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit, and 
(vn) unless specifically exempted or excluded or unless listed m 
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation 
which contains Pyrovalerone having a stimulant effect on the central 
nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers 
History: L. 1971, ch. 146, * 4; 1977, ch. 29, 
§ 4, 1979, ch. 12, * 3; 1981, ch. 75, § 2; 1989, 
ch. 263, * 1; 1990, ch. 101, * 2; 1991, ch. 198, 
$ 2; 1993, ch. 39, $ 1; 1994, ch. 8, * 1; 1997, 
ch. 64, < 4. 
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2Xa)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4XaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
undpr this chapter is upon conviction guiltv of one deeree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 146, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, S 6; 1979, ch. 12, * 5; 1986, 
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, * 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 96, $ 1; 
1989, ch. 60, $ 2; 1989, ch. 66, $ 1; 1989, ch. 
178,$ 1; 1989, ch. 187, * 2; 1989, ch. 201, $ 1; 
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, $ 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, $ 3; 1991, ch. 80, $ 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
$ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1996, ch. 284, § 1; 
1996, ch. 1, $ 8; 1997, ch. 64, $ 6. 
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76-10-1603. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the 
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, 
anv part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived 
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of 
Subsection (IK (2), or (3). 
History: C. 1953, 5 76-10-1603, enacted 
by L. 1967, ch. 238, § 3. 
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FOOD AND DRUGS Ch. l 
Sec. 
857. Repealed. 
858. Endangering human life while illegally manufacturing a contro l led 
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SUBCHAPTER I—CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT 
PART A—INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS 
§ 8 0 1 • Congressional findings and declarations: controlled sub-
stances 
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations 
(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a 
useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to 
maintain the health and general welfare of the American people 
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and 
possession and improper use of controlled substances have a 
substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general 
welfare of the American people 
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances 
flows through interstate and foreign commerce Incidents of the 
traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign 
flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, 
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate 
commerce because— 
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are 
tianspoitcd in interstate commerce, 
(B) cont? oiled substances distributed locally usually have 
been transported in mtei state commerce immediately before 
thiMr HiOnhutirm nnd 
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(C) contioiled substances possessed commonly | ] O V v 
thiough mtcistate commerce immediately prior to such p 0 s 
session 
(4) Local distnbution and possession of controlled substances 
contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances 
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intra 
state cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manu 
lactured and distributed interstate Thus, it is not feasible to 
distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances 
manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled sub 
stances manufactured and distributed intrastate 
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic m 
controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the 
interstate incidents of such traffic 
(7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions de 
signed to establish effective control over international and do 
mestic traffic in controlled substances 
(PubL 91-513, Title II, § 101, Oct 27, 1970, 84 Stat 1242) 
§ 8 0 1 a . Congressional flndings and declarations: psychotrophic 
substances 
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations: 
(1) The Congress has long recognized the danger involved in 
the manufacture, distribution, and use of certain psychotropic 
substances for nonscientific and nonmedical purposes, and has 
provided strong and effective legislation to control illicit traffick-
ing and to regulate legitimate uses of psychotropic substances in 
this country. Abuse of psychotropic substances has become a 
phenomenon common to many countries, however, and is not 
confined to national borders . It is, therefore, essential that the 
United States cooperate with other nations in establishing effec-
tive controls over international traffic in such substances. 
(2) The United States has joined with other countries in exe-
cuting an international treaty, entitled the Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances and signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 
21, 1971, which is designed to establish suitable controls over 
the manufacture, distribution, transfer, and use of certain psy-
chotropic substances. The Convention is not self-executing, and 
the obligations of the United States thereunder may only be 
performed pursuant to appropriate legislation. It is the intent of 
the Congress that the amendments made by this Act, together 
with existing law, will enable the United States to meet all of its 
obligations under the Convention and that no further legislation 
will be necessary for that purpose. 
(3) In implementing the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances, the Congress intends that, consistent with the obli-
gations of the United States under the Convention, control of 
psychotropic substances in the United States should be accom-
plished within the framework of the procedures and criteria for 
classification of substances provided in the Comprehensive Drn 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 Jt 
seq.]. This will insure that (A) the availability of psychotropi 
substances to manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, and re 
searchers for useful and legitimate medical and scientific p U r , 
poses will not be unduly restricted; (B) nothing in the Conven-
tion will interfere with bona fide research activities; and ( Q 
nothing in the Convention will interfere with ethical medical 
practice in this country as determined by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services on the basis of a consensus of the views of 
the American medical and scientific community. 
(Pub L. 95-633, Title I, § 101, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3768; Pub.L. 96-88 
Title V, § 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 695.) 
§ 8 0 2 . Definitions 
As used in this subchapter: 
(1) The term "addic t" means any individual who habitually 
uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals , 
health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of 
narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with 
reference to his addiction. 
(2) The term "adminis ter" refers to the direct applicat ion of a 
controlled substance to the body of a patient or research subject 
b y -
(A) a practi t ioner (or, in his presence, by his author ized 
agent), or 
(B) the patient or research subject at the direction and in 
the presence of the practitioner, 
whether such application be by injection, inhalation, ingestion, 
or any other means. 
(3) The term "agent" means an authorized person w h o acts on 
behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or 
dispenser; except that such term does not include a c o m m o n or 
contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of the carr i -
er or warehouseman, when acting in the usual and lawful course 
of the carrier 's or warehouseman 's business. 
(4) The term "Drug Enforcement Administration" means the 
Drug Enforcement Administration in the Department of Justice. 
(5) The term "control" means to add a drug or o ther sub-
stance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under pa r t B of 
this subchapter, whether by transfer from another schedule or 
otherwise. 
(6) The term "controlled substance" means a drug o r o ther 
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, 
III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The term does not 
include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as 
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those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986. 
(7) The term "counterfeit substance" means a controlled sub-
stance which, or the container or labeling of which, without 
authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identi-
fying mark, imprint, number, or device, or any likeness thereof, 
of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the per-
son or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dis-
pensed such substance and which thereby falsely purports or is 
represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by, 
such other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. 
(8) The terms "deliver" or "delivery" mean the actual, con-
structive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a 
listed chemical, whether or not there exists an agency relation-
ship. 
(9) The term "depressant or stimulant substance" means— 
(A) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid 
or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or 
(B) a drug which contains any quantity of (i) amphet-
amine or any of its optical isomers; (ii) any salt of amphet-
amine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or 
(iii) any substance which the Attorney General, after investi-
gation, has found to be, and by regulation designated as, 
habit forming because of its stimulant effect on the central 
nervous system; or 
(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(D) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance 
which the Attorney General, after investigation, has found to 
have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential for 
abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the 
central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect. 
(10) The term "dispense" means to deliver a controlled sub-
stance to an ultimate user or research subject by, or pursuant to 
the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and 
administering of a controlled substance and the packaging, label-
ing or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for such 
delivery. The term "dispenser" means a practitioner who so 
delivers a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research 
subject. 
(11) The term "distribute" means to deliver (other than by 
administering or dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed 
chemical. The term "distributor" means a person who so deliv-
cis a controlled substance oi a iisieu chemical. 
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(12) The term "drug" has the meaning given that term by 
section 321(g)(1) of this title. 
(13) The term "felony" means any Federal or State offense 
classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony. 
(14) The term "isomer" means the optical isomer, except as 
used in schedule 1(c) and schedule 11(a)(4). As used in schedule 
1(c), the term "isomer" means any optical, positional, or geome-
tric isomer. As used in schedule 11(a)(4), the term "isomer" 
means any optical or geometric isomer. 
(15) The term "manufacture" means the production, prepara-
tion, propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or 
other substance, either directly or indirectly or by extraction 
from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of 
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemi-
cal synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of such 
substance or labeling or relabeling of its container; except that 
such term does not include the preparation, compounding, pack-
aging, or labeling of a drug or other substance in conformity 
with applicable State or local law by a practitioner as an inci-
dent to his administration or dispensing of such drug or sub-
stance in the course of his professional practice. The term 
"manufacturer" means a person who manufactures a drug or 
other substance. 
(16) The term "marihuana" means all parts of the plant Can-
nabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the 
resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every com-
pound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of 
such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the 
mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil 
or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such 
mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or 
cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of 
germination. 
(17) The term "narcotic drug" means any of the following 
whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from sub-
stances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemi-
cal synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical 
synthesis: 
(A) Opium, opiates, derivatives of opium and opiates, in-
cluding their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of iso-
mers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such 
is n m n r < r»c~tr->t-r .-tt K ir< .-, I 1« I » -» , , , » i V - » ! • i « L. . ' , i I . ; f 
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ic chemical designation. Such term does not include the 
isoquinoline alkaloids of opium. 
(B) Poppy straw and concentrate of poppy straw. 
(C) Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca 
leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of 
ecgonine or their salts have been removed. 
(D) Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and 
salts of isomers. 
(E) Ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts 
of isomers. 
(F) Any compound, mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of any of the substances referred to in 
subparagraphs (A) through (E). 
(18) The term "opiate" means any drug or other substance 
having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability sim-
ilar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug 
having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. 
(19) The term "opium poppy" means the plant of the species 
Papaver somniferum L., except the seed thereof. 
(20) The term "poppy straw" means all parts, except the 
seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing. 
(21) The term "practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other per-
son licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United 
States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, 
to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, admin-
ister, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled 
substance in the course of professional practice or research. 
(22) The term "production" includes the manufacture, plant-
ing, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(23) The term "immediate precursor" means a substance— 
(A) which the Attorney General has found to be and by 
regulation designated as being the principal compound used, 
or produced primarily for use, in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance; 
(B) which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or 
likely to be used in the manufacture of such controlled 
substance; and 
(C) the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail 
or limit the manufacture of such controlled substance. 
(24) The term "Secretary", unless the context otherwise indi-
cates, means the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
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(25) The term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury 
which involves— 
(A) a substantial risk of death; 
(B) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or 
(C) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a 
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. 
(26) The term "State" means a State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or pos-
session of the United States. 
(27) The term "ultimate user" means a person who has law-
fully obtained, and who possess, a controlled substance for his 
own use or for the use of a member of his household or for an 
animal owned by him or by a member of his household. 
(28) The term "United States", when used in a geographic 
sense, means all places and waters, continental or insular, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(29) The term "maintenance treatment" means the dispens-
ing, for a period in excess of twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug 
in the treatment of an individual for dependence upon heroin or 
other morphine-like drugs. 
(30) The term "detoxification treatment" means the dispens-
ing, for a period not in excess of one hundred and eighty days, of 
a narcotic drug in decreasing doses to an individual in order to 
alleviate adverse physiological or psychological effects incident 
to withdrawal from the continuous or sustained use of a narcotic 
drug and as a method of bringing the individual to a narcotic 
drug-free state within such period. 
(31) The term "Convention on Psychotropic Substances" 
means the Convention on Psychotropic Substances signed at 
Vienna, Austria, on February 21, 1971; and the term "Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs" means the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs signed at New York, New York, on March 30, 
1961. 
(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term 
"controlled substance analogue" means a substance— 
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar 
to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in sched-
ule I or II; 
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic 
effect on the central nervous system that is substantially 
similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a 
controlled substance in schedule I or II; or 
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(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such p e r . 
son represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant,
 0 r 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is 
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depres-
sant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system 
of a controlled substance in schedule I or II. 
(B) Such term does not include— 
(i) a controlled substance; 
(ii) any substance for which there is an approved new 
drug application; 
(iii) with respect to a particular person any substance, if 
an exemption is in effect for investigational use, for that 
person, under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) to the extent conduct with 
respect to such substance is pursuant to such exemption; or 
(iv) any substance to the extent not intended for human 
consumption before such an exemption takes effect with 
respect to that substance. 
(33) The term "listed chemical" means any list I chemical or 
any list II chemical. 
(34) The term "list I chemical" means a chemical specified by 
regulation of the Attorney General as a chemical that is used in 
manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of this sub-
chapter and is important to the manufacture of the controlled 
substances, and such term includes (until otherwise specified by 
regulation of the Attorney General, as considered appropriate by 
the Attorney General or upon petition to the Attorney General by 
any person) the following: 
(A) Anthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts. 
(B) Benzyl cyanide. 
(C) Ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of opti-
cal isomers. 
(D) Ergonovine and its salts. 
(E) Ergotamine and its salts. 
(F) N-Acetylanthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts. 
(G) Norpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and 
salts of optical isomers. 
(H) Phenylacetic acid, its esters, and its salts. 
(I) Phenylpropanolamine, its salts, optical isomers, and 
salts of optical isomers. 
(J) Pipcridine and its salts. 
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(K) Pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts 
of optical isomers. 
(L) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone. 
(M) Methylamine. 
(N) Ethylamine. 
(O) Propionic anhydride. 
(P) Isosafrole. 
(Q) Safrole. 
(R) Piperonal. 
(S) N-Methylephedrine. 
(T) N-methylpseudoephedrine. 
(U) Hydriodic acid. 
(V) Benzaldehyde. 
(W) Nitroethane. 
(X) Any salt, optical isomer, or salt of an optical isomer of 
the chemicals listed in subparagraphs (M) through (U) of this 
paragraph. 
(35) The term "list II chemical" means a chemical (other than 
a list I chemical) specified by regulation of the Attorney General 
as a chemical that is used in manufacturing a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this subchapter, and such term includes 
(until otherwise specified by regulation of the Attorney General, 
as considered appropriate by the Attorney General or upon 
petition to the Attorney General by any person) the following 
chemicals: 
(A) Acetic anhydride. 
(B) Acetone. 
(C) Benzyl chloride. 
(D) Ethyl ether. 
(E) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXIII, § 2301(b), 
Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4858 
(F) Potassium permanganate. 
(G) 2-Butanone (or Methyl Ethyl Ketone). 
(H) Toluene. 
(I) Iodine. 
(J) Hydrochloric gas. 
(36) The term "regular customer" means, with respect to a 
regulated person, a customer with whom the regulated person 
has an established business relationship that is reported to thr 
Attorney Geneial. 
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(37) The term "regular importer" means, with respect to 
listed chemical, a person that has an established record as an 
importer of that listed chemical that is reported to the Attorney 
General. 
(38) The term "regulated person" means a person who manu-
factures, distributes, imports, or exports a listed chemical,
 a 
tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine or who acts as a 
broker or t rader for an international transaction involving
 a 
listed chemical, a tableting machine, or an encapsulating ma-
chine. 
(39) The term "regulated transaction" means— 
(A) a distribution, receipt, sale, importation, or exporta-
tion of, or an international transaction involving shipment 
of, a listed chemical, or if the Attorney General establishes a 
threshold amount for a specific listed chemical, a threshold 
amount, including a cumulative threshold amount for multi-
ple transactions (as determined by the Attorney General, in 
consultation with the chemical industry and taking into 
consideration the quantities normally used for lawful pur-
poses), of a listed chemical, except that such term does not 
include— 
(i) a domestic lawful distribution in the usual course 
of business between agents or employees of a single 
regulated person; 
(ii) a delivery of a listed chemical to or by a common 
or contract carrier for carriage in the lawful and usual 
course of the business of the common or contract carri-
er, or to or by a warehouseman for storage in the lawful 
and usual course of the business of the warehouseman, 
except that if the carriage or storage is in connection 
with the distribution, importation, or exportation of a 
listed chemical to a third person, this clause does not 
relieve a distributor, importer, or exporter from compli-
ance with section 830 of this title; 
(iii) any category of transaction or any category of 
transaction for a specific listed chemical or chemicals 
specified by regulation of the Attorney General as ex-
cluded from this definition as unnecessary for enforce-
ment of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter; 
(iv) any transaction in a listed chemical that is con-
tained in a drug that may be marketed or distributed 
lawfully in the United States under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U S C 301 et seq.) unless— 
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(I)(aa) the drug contains ephedrine or its salts, 
optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers, pseu-
doephedrine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of 
optical isomers, or phenylpropanolamine or its 
salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers 
unless otherwise provided by regulation of the At-
torney General issued pursuant to section 814(e) of 
this title, except that any sale of ordinary over-the-
counter pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine 
products by retail distributors shall not be a regulat-
ed transaction (except as provided in section 401(d) 
of the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control 
Act of 1996); or 
(bb) the Attorney General has determined under 
section 814 of this title that the drug or g roup of 
drugs is being diverted to obtain the listed chemical 
for use in the illicit production of a controlled 
substance; and 
(II) the quantity of ephedrine, pseudoephedr ine , 
phenylpropanolamine, or other listed chemical con-
tained in the drug included in the t ransact ion or 
multiple transactions equals or exceeds the thresh-
old established for that chemical by the Attorney 
General, except that the threshold for any sale of 
products containing pseudoephedrine or phenylpro-
panolamine products by retail distributors o r by 
distributors required to submit reports by section 
830(b)(3) of this title shall be 24 grams of pseu-
doephedrine or 24 grams of phenylpropanolamine 
in a single transaction; or 
(v) any transaction in a chemical mixture which the 
Attorney General has by regulation designated as ex-
empt from the application of this subchapter and sub-
chapter II of this chapter based on a finding that the 
mixture is formulated in such a way that it cannot be 
easily used in the illicit production of a controlled sub-
stance and that the listed chemical or chemicals con-
tained in the mixture cannot be readily recovered; and 
(B) a distribution, importation, or exportation of a tablet-
ing machine or encapsulating machine. 
(40) The term "chemical mixture" means a combination of 
two or more chemical substances, at least one of which is not a . 
list I chemical or a list II chemical, except that such term does 
not include any combination of a list I chemical or a list II 
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chemical with another chemical that is present solely as an 
impurity. 
(41)(A) The term "anabolic steroid" means any drug or hor-
monal substance, chemically and pharmacologically related to 
testosterone (other than estrogens, progestins, and corticoster-
oids) that promotes muscle growth, and includes— 
(i) boldenone, 
(ii) chlorotestosterone, 
(iii) clostebol, 
(iv) dehydrochlormethyltestosterone, 
(v) dihydrotestosterone, 
(vi) drostanolone, 
(vii) ethylestrenol, 
(viii) fluoxymesterone, 
(ix) formebulone, 
(x) mesterolone, 
(xi) methandienone, 
(xii) methandranone , 
(xiii) methandriol , 
(xiv) methandrostenolone, 
(xv) methenolone, 
(xvi) methyl testosterone, 
(xvii) mibolerone, 
(xvlii) nandrolone, 
(xix) norethandrolone, 
(xx) oxandrolone, 
(xxi) oxymesterone, 
(xxii) oxymetholone, 
(xxiii) stanolone, 
(xxiv) stanozolol, 
(xxv) testolactone, 
(xxvi) testosterone, 
(xxvii) trenbolone, and 
(xxviii) any salt, ester, or isomer of a drug or substance 
described or listed in this paragraph, if that salt, ester, or 
isomer promotes muscle growth. 
(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), such term does not 
include an anabolic steroid which is c x p ^ ^ l y intended ioi 
administration through implants to cattle or other nonhuman 
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species and which has been approved by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services for such administration. 
(ii) If any person prescribes, dispenses, or distributes such 
steroid for human use, such person shall be considered to have 
prescribed, dispensed, or distributed an anabolic steroid within 
the meaning of subparagraph (A). 
(42) The term "international t ransaction" means a transaction 
involving the shipment of a listed chemical across an internation-
al border (other than a United States border) in which a broker 
or t rader located in the United States participates. 
(43) The terms "broker" and " t rader" mean a person that 
assists in arranging an international transaction in a listed chem-
ical by— 
(A) negotiating contracts; 
(B) serving as an agent or intermediary; or 
(C) bringing together a buyer and seller, a buyer and 
transporter, or a seller and transporter. 
(44) The term "felony drug offense" means an offense that is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any 
law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that 
prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, mari-
huana, or depressant or stimulant substances. 
(45) The term "ordinary over-the-counter pseudoephedrine or 
phenylpropanolamine product" means any product containing 
pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine that is— 
(A) regulated pursuant to this subchapter; and 
(B)(i) except for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more 
than 3.0 grams of pseudoephedrine base or 3.0 grams of 
phenylpropanolamine base, and that is packaged in blister 
packs, each blister containing not more than two dosage 
units, or where the use of blister packs is technically infeasi-
ble, that is packaged in unit dose packets or pouches; and 
(ii) for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more than 3.0 
grams of pseudoephedrine base or 3.0 grams of phenylpro-
panolamine base. 
(46)(A) The term "retail distributor" means a grocery store, 
general merchandise store, drug store, or other entity or person 
whose activities as a distributor relating to pseudoephedrine or 
phenylpropanolamine products are limited almost exclusively to 
sales for personal use, both in number of sales and volume ol 
sales, either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-fai c 
transactions bv direct sales. 
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(B) For purposes of this paragraph, sale for personal
 U s 
means the sale of below-threshold quantities in a single transac 
tion to an individual for legitimate medical use. 
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, entities are defined by 
reference to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, as 
follows: 
(i) A grocery store is an entity within SIC code 5411. 
(ii) A general merchandise store is an entity within SIC 
codes 5300 through 5399 and 5499. 
(Hi) A drug store is an entity within SIC code 5912. 
(Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 102, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242; Pub.L. 93-281 
§ 2, May 14, 1974, 88 Stat. 124; Pub.L. 95-633, Tide I, § 102(b), Nov lo' 
1978, 92 Stat. 3772; Pub.L. 96-88, Title V, § 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat' 
695, Pub.L. 96-132, § 16(a), Nov. 30, 1979, 93 Stat. 1049; Pub.L. 98^»73* 
Title II, § 507(a), (b), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071; Pub.L. 98-509, Title III' 
§ 301(a), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2364; Pub.L. 99-570, Title I, §§ 1003(b)' 
1203, 1870, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-6, 3207-13, 3207-56; Pub L ' 
99-646, § 83, Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3619; Pub.L. 100-690, Title VI 
§ 6054, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4316; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XIX, § 1902(b)' 
Title XXIII, § 2301, Title XXXV, § 35991, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4852' 
4858, 4932; Pub.L. 103-200, §§ 2(a), 7 to 9(a), Dec. 17, 1993, 107 Stat' 
2333, 2340, Pub.L. 103-322, Title IX, § 90105(d), Title XXXIII, § 330024(a) 
(b), (d)(1), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1988, 2150; Pub.L. 104-237, Title Ii ' 
§§ 204(a), 209, Title IV, § 401(a), (b), Oct. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 3102, 3104' 
3106, 3107; Pub.L. 104-294, Title VI, §§ 604(b)(4), 607(j), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 
Slat. 3506, 3512; Pub.L. 105-115, Title I, § 126(c)(3), Nov. 21, 1997 111 
Stat. 2328.) 
§ 8 0 3 . Repealed. Pub.L. 95-137, § 1(b), Oct. 18, 1977, 91 Stat. 
1169 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section, Pub.L. 95-513, Title II, § 103, 300 agents, together with necessary sup-
Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1245, authorized porting personnel, and provided for ap-
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous propriations of $6,000,000 to carry out 
Drugs to add, during the fiscal year 1971, such addition. 
PART B—AUTHORITY TO CONTROL; STANDARDS AND SCHEDULES 
§ 8 1 1 . Authority and criteria for classification of substances 
(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing 
The Attorney General shall apply the provisions of this subchapter 
to the controlled substances listed in the schedules established by 
section 812 of this title and to any other drug or other substance 
added to such schedules under this subchapter. Except as provided 
in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the Attorney General may by 
uilc— 
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules 
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(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential 
for abuse, and 
(B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance 
the findings prescribed by subsection (b) of section 812 of 
this title for the schedule in which such drug is to be placed; 
or 
(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if 
he finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the 
requirements for inclusion in any schedule. 
Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on 
the record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking 
procedures prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5. 
Proceedings for the issuance, amendment , or repeal of such rules 
may be initiated by the Attorney General (1) on his own motion, (2) 
at the request of the Secretary, or (3) on the petition of any interested 
party. 
(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances 
The Attorney General shall, before initiating proceedings unde r 
subsection (a) of this section to control a drug or other substance or 
to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the schedules, and 
after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secretary a 
scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to 
whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or 
removed as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and 
recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in 
paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) of this section 
and any scientific or medical considerations involved in p a r a g r a p h s 
(1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The recommendations of the 
Secretary shall include recommendations with respect to the appro -
priate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other substance 
should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the 
Secretary shall be made in writing and submitted to the Attorney 
General within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the 
Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney 
General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the Secre-
tary recommends that a drug or other substance not be controlled, 
the Attorney General shall not control the drug or other substance. 
If the Attorney General determines that these facts and all o ther 
relevant data constitute substantial evidence of potential for abuse 
such as to warrant control or substantial evidence that the drug or 
other substance should be removed entirely Irom the schedules, he 
shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case may be, 
under subsection (a) of this section. 
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(c) Factors determinat ive of control or removal from schedules 
In making any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under 
subsection (b) of section 812 of this title, the Attorney General shall 
consider the following factors with respect to each drug or other 
substance proposed to be controlled or removed from the schedules-
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. 
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. 
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the 
drug or other substance. 
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse. 
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. 
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. 
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability. 
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a 
substance already controlled under this subchapter. 
(d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring con-
trol; procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Con-
vention on Psychotropic Substances 
(1) If control is required by United States obligations under inter-
national treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 
1970, the Attorney General shall issue an order controlling such drug 
under the schedule he deems most appropriate to carry out such 
obligations, without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) 
of this section o r section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the 
procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this section. 
(2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has 
been transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to 
article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may 
justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the 
Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to 
another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall 
immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services who shall publish it in the Federal Register and 
provide opportunity to interested persons to submit to him comments 
respecting the scientific and medical evaluations which he is to 
prepare respecting such drug or substance. The Secretary of Health 
and Human Services shall prepare for transmission through the 
Secretary of State to the World Health Organization such medical 
and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regarding the possi-
ble action that could be proposed by the World Health Organization 
r<>M>e<*fing thr drug or substance with respect to which a notice was 
transmitted under this subparagraph. 
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(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to 
Jecide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the 
sChedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one 
schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of 
State shall t ransmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services of such information who shall publish a summary ol 
such information in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to 
interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the recom-
mendation which he is to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, 
respecting such proposal . The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a recommendation 
to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on the representative 
of the United States in discussions and negotiations relating to the 
proposal. 
(3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling 
decision pursuant to article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances that a drug or other substance has been added or trans-
ferred to a schedule specified in the notification or receives notifica-
tion (referred to in this subsection as a "schedule notice") that 
existing legal controls applicable under this subchapter to a drug or 
substance and the controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.] do not meet the require-
ments of the schedule of the Convention in which such drug or 
substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, after consultation with the Attorney General, shall first 
determine whether existing legal controls under this subchapter 
applicable to the drug or substance and the controls required by the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, meet the requirements of the 
schedule specified in the notification or schedule notice and shall 
take the following action: 
(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services nonetheless be-
lieves that more stringent controls should be applied to the drug 
or substance, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney 
General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or 
substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to 
apply to such controls. 
(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls 
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services concurs in the 
scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted by the notifi-
cation, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney Geneial 
that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug oi substance 
under the appropriate schedule pursuant to sub,vUion^» (a) uhd 
(b) of this section. 
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(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controk 
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services does not 
concur in the scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted 
by the notification, the Secretary shall— 
(i) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to 
protect the public health and safety, recommend to the 
Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling 
the drug or substance pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of 
this section, to apply such additional controls; 
(ii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of 
qualified acceptance, within the period specified in the Con-
vention, pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Conven-
tion, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; 
(Hi) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of 
qualified acceptance as prescribed in clause (ii) and request 
the Secretary of State to ask for a review by the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, in accordance 
with paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention, of the 
scheduling decision; or 
(iv) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary 
of State to take appropriate action under the Convention to 
initiate proceedings to remove the drug or substance from 
the schedules under the Convention or to transfer the drug 
or substance to a schedule under the Convention different 
from the one specified in the schedule notice. 
(4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, that proceedings initi-
ated under recommendations made under paragraph (B) or (C)(i) of 
paragraph (3) will not be completed within the time period required 
by paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, 
after consultation with the Secretary and after providing interested 
persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements 
of the temporary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a 
temporary order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV 
or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum 
United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the 
Convention. As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, 
after consultation with the Secretary, except such drug or substance 
In »ni the application of any provision of part C of this subchapter 
which he finds is not required to carry out the United States obli-
gations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. In the case 
ol proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), the 
Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order, shall 
i<«jiust the Secietary ol State to transmit a notice ol qualified 
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acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant 
(0 paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. A temporary order 
|SSued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance 
subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the 
drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings. 
(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision 
with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause 
(ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under 
clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance 
described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and after 
providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments re-
specting the requirements of the order to be issued under this 
sentence, shall issue an order controlling the drug or substance 
under schedule IV or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out 
the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 
2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or substance for which a 
notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted or whichever the 
Attorney General determines is appropriate in the case of a drug or 
substance described in a schedule notice. As a part of such order, 
the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the Secretary, 
except such drug or substance from the application of any provision 
of part C of this subchapter which he finds is not required to carry 
out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of 
the Convention. If, as a result of a review under paragraph 8 of 
article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling decision with respect to 
which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted in accordance 
with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C)— 
(i) the decision is reversed, and 
(ii) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not 
required to be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the 
minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 
2 of the Convention, 
the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug 
or substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the 
review decision. If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action 
initiated under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph 
(3)(C), the drug or substance with respect to which such action was 
taken is not required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the 
nider issued under this paragraph with respect to such drug or 
substance shall expire upon receipt by the United Slates of a notice ol 
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the action taken with respect to such drug or substance under tk 
Convention. 
(C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) may be issued 
without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of thi 
section or by section 812(b) of this title and without regard to th 
procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section. 
(5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1978 or the regulations or orders promulgated there-
under shall be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services or the Attorney General through the 
Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other applicable provi-
sions of the Convention, for review of scheduling decisions under 
such Convention, based on new or additional information. 
(e) Immediate precursors 
The Attorney General may, without regard to the findings required 
by subsection (a) of this section or section 812(b) of this title and 
without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the same sched-
ule in which the controlled substance of which it is an immediate 
precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher numerical 
designation. If the Attorney General designates a substance as an 
immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances 
shall not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precur-
sors. 
( 0 Abuse potential 
If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to the Secretary 
for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an abuse 
potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to 
the Attorney General. 
(g) Exclusion of non-narcotic substances sold over counter without a 
prescription; dextromethorphan; exemption of substances 
lacking abuse potential 
(1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude any non-
narcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.], be 
lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription. 
(2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any 
schedule bv reason of enactment ol this subchapter unless controlled 
after October 27, 1970 pursuant to the foregoing provisions ol this 
section 
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(3) The Attorney General may, by regulation, exempt any com-
pound, mixture, or preparation containing a controlled substance 
from the application of all or any part of this subchapter if he finds 
such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements of 
one of the following categories: 
(A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic con-
trolled substance, which mixture or preparation is approved lor 
prescription use, and which contains one or more other active 
ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which are 
included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or 
concentration as to vitiate the potential for abuse. 
(B) A compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any 
controlled substance, which is not for administration to a human 
being or animal, and which is packaged in such form or concen-
tration, or with adulterants or denaturants , so that as packaged it 
does not present any significant potential for abuse. 
(h) Temporary scheduling to avoid imminent hazards to public 
safety 
(1) If the Attorney General finds that the scheduling of a substance 
in schedule I on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent 
hazard to the public safety, he may, by order and without regard to 
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section relating to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, schedule such substance in 
schedule I if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in 
section 812 of this title or if no exemption or approval is in effect for 
the substance under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 355]. Such an order may not be issued 
before the expiration of thirty days from— 
(A) the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a 
notice in the Federal Register of the intention to issue such o rde r 
and the grounds upon which such order is to be issued, and 
(B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice 
required by paragraph (4). 
(2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall 
expire at the end of one year from the date of the issuance of the 
order scheduling such substance, except that the Attorney General 
may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (a)(1) of 
this section with respect to the substance, extend the temporary 
scheduling for up to six months. 
(3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney 
General shall be required to consider, with respect to the finding M 
an imminent ha /a rd to the public safety, only those factors set forth 
in paiagraphs (4), (5), and (6) ol subsection (c) o( thib section, 
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including actual abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clar 
destine importation, manufacture, or distribution. 
(4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an order p r o . 
posed to be issued under paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services. In issuing an order under paragraph (1), the 
Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments submit-
ted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted pursuant to 
this paragraph. 
(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a sub-
stance shall be vacated upon the conclusion of a subsequent rulemak-
ing proceeding initiated under subsection (a) of this section with 
respect to such substance. 
(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial 
review. 
(Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 201, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1245; Pub.L. 95-633, 
Title I, § 102(a), Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3769; Pub.L. 96-88, Title V, 
§ 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 695; Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 508, 509(a), 
Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071, 2072.) 
§ 8 1 2 . Schedules of controlled substances 
(a) Establishment 
There are established five schedules of controlled substances, to be 
known as schedules I, II, III, IV, and V. Such schedules shall 
initially consist of the substances listed in this section. The schedules 
established by this section shall be updated and republished on a 
semiannual basis during the two-year period beginning one year after 
October 27, 1970 and shall be updated and republished on an annual 
basis thereafter. 
(b) Placement on schedules; findings required 
Except where control is required by United States obligations 
under an international treaty, convention, or protocol, in effect on 
October 27, 1970, and except in the case of an immediate precursor , 
a drug or other substance may not be placed in any schedule unless 
the findings required for such schedule are made with respect to 
such drug or other substance. The findings required for each of the 
schedules are as follows: 
(1) Schedule I.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for 
abuse. 
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted 
medical use in t reatment in the United States. 
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the d rug or 
other substance under medical supervision. 
(2) Schedule II.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for 
abuse. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States or a current ly 
accepted medical use with severe restrictions. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe 
psychological or physical dependence. 
(3) Schedule III.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less 
than the drugs or other substances in schedules I and II. 
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(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moder-
ate or low physical dependence or high psychological depen-
dence. 
(4) Schedule IV.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse 
relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted 
medical use in t reatment in the United States. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited 
physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the 
drugs or other substances in schedule III. 
(5) Schedule V.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse 
relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted 
medical use in t reatment in the United States. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited 
physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the 
drugs or other substances in schedule IV. 
(c) Initial schedules of controlled substances 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall, unless and until a m e n d e d ' 
pursuant to section 811 of this title, consist of the following drugs or 
other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, 
chemical name, or brand name designated: 
Schedule I 
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, 
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the 
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within 
the specific chemical designation: 
(1) Acetylmethadol. 
(2) Allylprodine. 
(3) Alphacetylmathadol.2 
(4) Alphameprodine. 
(5) Alphamethadol. 
(6) Ben/ethidinc. 
(7) Brtacetvlmethadol 
(8) Betameprodine 
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(9) Betamethadol. 
(10) Betaprodine. 
(11) Clonitazene. 
(12) Dextromoramide. 
(13) Dextrorphan. 
(14) Diampromide. 
(15) Diethylthiambutene. 
(16) Dimenoxadol. 
(17) Dimepheptanol. 
(18) Dimethyithiambutene. 
(19) Dioxaphetyl butyrate. 
(20) Dipipanone. 
(21) Ethylmethylthiambutene. 
(22) Etonitazene. 
(23) Etoxeridine. 
(24) Furethidine. 
(25) Hydroxypethidine. 
(26) Ketobemidone. 
(27) Levomoramide. 
(28) Levophenacylmorphan. 
(29) Morpheridine. 
(30) Noracymethadol. 
(31) Norlevorphanol. 
(32) Normethadone. 
(33) Norpipanone. 
(34) Phenadoxone. 
(35) Phenampromide. 
(36) Phenomorphan. 
(37) Phenoperidine. 
(38) Piritramide. 
(39) Proheptazine. 
(40) Properidine. 
(41) Racemoramide. 
(42) Trimeperidine. 
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and 
salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and 
saltb u[ i^nici-> i^» pu^>iblc within the specific chemical designation 
(1) Acetorphme. 
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(2) Acetyldihydrocodeine. 
(3) Benzylmorphine. 
(4) Codeine methylbromide. 
(5) Codeine-N-Oxide. 
(6) Cyprenorphine. 
(7) Desomorphine. 
(8) Dihydromorphine. 
(9) Etorphine. 
(10) Heroin. 
(11) Hydromorphinol . 
(12) Methyldesorphine. 
(13) Methylhydromorphine. 
(14) Morphine methylbromide. 
(15) Morphine methylsulfonate. 
(16) Morphine-N-Oxide. 
(17) Myrophine. 
(18) Nicocodeine. 
(19) Nicomorphine. 
(20) Normorphine. 
(21) Pholcodine. 
(22) Thebacon. 
(c) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparat ion, which con-
tains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or 
which contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers 
whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is 
possible within the specific chemical designation: 
(1) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine. 
(2) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine. 
(3) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine. 
(4) Bufotenine. 
(5) Diethyltryptamine. 
(6) Dimethyltryptamine. 
(7) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine. 
(8) Ibogaine. 
(9) Lysergic acid diethylamide. 
(10) Marihuana. 
(11) Mescaline. 
(12) Peyote. 
(13) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl ben/ilale. 
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(14) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate. 
(15) Psilocybin. 
(16) Psilocyn. 
(17) Tetrahydrocannabinols. 
Schedule II 
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following substances whether produced directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or inde-
pendently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combinat ion of 
extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(1) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparat ion of opium or opiate. 
(2) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparat ion thereof 
which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the 
substances referred to in clause (1), except that these substances 
shall not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium. 
(3) Opium poppy and poppy straw. 
(4) Coca leaves except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves 
from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine o r 
their salts have been removed; cocaine, its salts, optical and 
geometric isomers, and salts of isomers; ecgonine, its deriva-
tives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; o r any com-
pound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quanti ty of 
any of the substances referred to in this paragraph. 
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, es ters , 
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters and ethers, whenever the 
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within 
the specific chemical designation: 
(1) Alphaprodine. 
(2) Anileridine. 
(3) Bezitramide. 
(4) Dihydrocodeine. 
(5) Diphenoxylate. 
(6) Fentanyl. 
(7) Isomethadone. 
(8) Levomethorphan. 
(9) Levorphanol. 
(10) Metazocine. 
(11) Methadone. 
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(12) Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4 
4-diphenyl butane. 
(13) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholino-l, l.^i-
phenylpropane-carboxylic acid. 
(14) Pethidine. 
(15) Pethidine-Intermediate-A, 4-cyano-1 -methyl-4-phenylpi. 
peridine. 
(16) Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-car-
boxy late. 
(17) Pethidine-Intermediate-C, 1 -methyl-4-phenylpiperi-
dine-4-carboxylic acid. 
(18) Phenazocine. 
(19) Piminodine. 
(20) Racemethorphan. 
(21) Racemorphan. 
(c) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any injectable liquid which contains any quantity of metham-
phetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. 
Schedule III 
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system: 
(1) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its 
optical isomers. 
(2) Phenmetrazine and its salts. 
(3) Any substance (except an injectable liquid) which contains 
any quantity of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, 
and salts of isomers. 
(4) Methylphenidate. 
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect 
on the central nervous system: 
(1) Any substance which contains any quantity of a derivative 
of barbituric acid, or any salt of a derivative of barbituric acid. 
(2) Chorhexadol. 
(3) Glutethimide. 
(4) Lyscigic acal. 
(5) Lysergic acid amide. 
(6) Mcthvprylon. 
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(7) Phencyclidine. 
(8) Sulfondiethylmethane. 
(9) Sulfonethylmethane. 
(10) Sulfonmethane. 
(c) Nalorphine. 
(d) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparat ion containing 
limited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts 
thereof: 
(1) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or 
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or 
greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium. 
(2) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or 
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more 
active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic 
amounts . 
(3) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone per 
100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, 
with a fourfold or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of 
opium. 
(4) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone per 
100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, 
with one or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized 
therapeutic amounts . 
(5) Not more than 1.8 grams of dihydrocodeine per 100 millil-
iters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or 
more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic 
amounts . 
(6) Not more than 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 
milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with 
one or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized thera-
peutic amounts . 
(7) Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters 
or per 100 grams, or not more than 25 milligrams per dosage 
unit, with one or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recog-
nized therapeutic amounts. 
(8) Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine per 100 millili-
t e r oi p^.i 100 g iams with one or more active, nonnarcotic 
ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts. 
(e) Anabolic steroids 
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Schedule IV 
(1) Barbital. 
(2) Chloral betaine. 
(3) Chloral hydrate. 
(4) Ethchlorvynol. 
(5) Ethinamate. 
(6) Methohexital. 
(7) Meprobamate. 
(8) Methylphenobarbital. 
(9) Paraldehyde. 
(10) Petrichloral. 
(11) Phenobarbital. 
Schedule V 
Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the 
following limited quantities of narcotic drugs, which shall include 
one or more nonnarcotic active medicinal ingredients in sufficient 
proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation 
valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the nar-
cotic drug alone: 
(1) Not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 millili-
ters or per 100 grams. 
(2) Not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100 
milliliters or per 100 grams. 
(3) Not more than 100 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 
milliliters or per 100 grams. 
(4) Not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not 
less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit. 
(5) Not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters 
or per 100 grams. 
(Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 202, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1247; Pub.L. 95-633 , 
Title I, § 103, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3772; Pub.L. 98-473, Title II. 
§§ 507(c), 509(b), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071, 2072; Pub.L. 99-570. Title I. 
§ 1867, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-55; Pub.L. 99-646, § 84, Nov. 10, 
1986, 100 Stat. 3619; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XIX, § 1902(a), Nov. 29, 1990, 
104 Stat. 4851.) 
1
 Revised schedules a re published in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308 ol 
I it It* 21 , Food and Drugs 
2
 So in original Probably should be "Alphacetylmethadol" 
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FILED 
l-OLiih Judicial District Court 
oi Utah County, Stats of Utah 
Dsputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES MOONEY, 
LINDA MOONEY, 
OKLEVUEHA EARTHWALKS NATIVE 
AMERICAN CHURCH OF UTAH, INC. 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 001404536 
DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 2001 
JUDGE: GARY D. STOTT 
CLERK: LG 
1. On May 16, 2001, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
2. On May 17, 2001 a Preliminary Hearing was conducted in this matter. 
3. On June 4, 2001, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information. 
4. On June 8, 2001, Defendant filed an Affidavit in Support of Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information. 
5. On June 25, 2001, the State filed their Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
6. On July 11, 2001, Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
7. On August 1, 2001, Oral Arguments were heard before this Court. 
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The Court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda of the parties, now enters the 
following findings and ruling: 
I 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendants, in their Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Dismiss, recites no facts 
The State of Utah, in its Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, sets forth facts which 
have not been disputed by Defendants. Accordingly, the Court adopts the following facts: 
1. On May 17, 2001, this Court conducted a preliminary hearing for James and 
Linda Mooney and the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church (OENAC), for 
multiple charges of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise to distribute drugs, in 
violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(l)(iv), as well as engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity. 
2. At the preliminary hearing, it was established (at least to a standard of probable 
cause) that James and Linda Mooney, acting in their capacity as principals in OENAC, 
repeatedly met with groups averaging about 10-15 people and distributed peyote, a Schedule 
One controlled substance, to those groups of people. 
3. It is undisputed that these meetings took place in Utah County on or about the 
dates indicated in the Information. 
n 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Defendants argue that both James and Linda Mooney are members and spiritual 
leaders of the Okelvueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., and have been 
since the creation of the Church in April 1997. Furthermore, that Defendant Okelvueha 
Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., is a domestic, non-profit corporation in 
good standing and is authorized by the Utah Department of Commerce since April 1997 to 
conduct business in the State of Utah. As members of a Native American Church, 
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Defendants argue that they are exempt from criminal prosecution for their possession, use or 
distribution of peyote medicine for bonafide religious purposes and ceremonies under federal 
and state constitution and laws. 
Defendants assert that Utah law incorporates the specific exception in the Federal 
Controlled Substance Act for the use of peyote for religious purposes by members of the 
Native American Church (NAC). Defendants further argue that any interpretation of the laws 
restricting the rights of Native American Indians who are not members of a federally 
recognized tribe, or restricting the right of members of the NAC who are not members of a 
federally recognized tribe, to use peyote for religious purposes, violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Defendants also contend that their possession and use of peyote in conjunction with 
bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC is an activity protected under the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment and that the State must justify an encroachment on such 
religious liberty by showing it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest. 
A. IncprppratWH Of Vtflfa Iflw as tQ fog Spwifit Excgptipp "* fog Feforal Controlled 
Substance Act. 
Defendants cite the language of § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) in support of their proposition 
that the federal exception, listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is applicable to the State. However, 
Utah law forbids the possession of controlled substances, which are any substance listed in 
U.C.A. §58-37-4 or in the Federal Controlled Substance Act listed in U.C.A. § 58-37-3. 
Peyote is specifically listed as a controlled substance under U.C.A. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V). 
This section of the code provides that peyote is considered controlled unless "specifically 
excepted or unless listed on another schedule.-U.C.A. § 58-37-4(2)(iii) (2000 Supp.). This 
Court agrees with the State that the extension of protection listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 from 
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prosecution does not apply to non-Indian members of the NAC. It is clear to this court that 
the protection from prosecution of non-Indians, regardless of whether they are members of the 
NAC, is not a "specific exception" within the meaning of § 58-37-4. 
B. Free Exercise Claim and the Firtf Amfrnflflient 
Defendants cite that their possession, use and distribution of peyote in conjunction 
with bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC is an activity protected under the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment. The State must justify an inroad on religious liberty by 
showing it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. Thomas 
v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S. Ct. 
1425, 1432, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1980). This Court must first determine whether the State's 
action does in fact create a burden on the Defendants' religion and if so, is there a compelling 
reason for the government's action in this case. 
In considering the first step of the analysis, from the limited information provided to 
date it appears to this Court that the NAC is an established religion with a significant history 
of sacramental peyote use. In addition, this Court also concedes that the use of peyote as a 
sacramental ritual is a significant process in the religious practices of the NAC. Consequently, 
the State's prosecution of Defendants for their use and possession of distribution of peyote may 
create an imposition or burden on the Defendants as members of the NAC. However, the 
main issue of fact in this case is whether Defendants distributed peyote to individuals who 
were non-Indian members of Oklevueha Earth walks Native American Church. 
The burden, if any, on the Defendants must be balanced by showing that the State 
has used the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling interest. 450 U.S. at 718. 
The conduct or actions in accord with religious convictions that have been regulated have 
invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. Sherbert v. Verner, 
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374 U.S. at 402-03, 83 S. Ct. at 1792-93. Subsequently, the State's interests in prosecuting 
the Defendants must be examined. 
The State has a legitimate interest in protecting society from illegal drug use. They 
also have an interest in preventing abuse of peyote by non-exempted individuals. When 
examining the promulgation of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, the legislative history clearly does not 
support a finding that Congress was interested in a broad exemption for religious use of peyote 
by non-NAC members or non-Indians. Upon examination of the Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, it is clear that officials of the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) informed Congress of the fact that the administrative 
exemption in effect at the time the Controlled Substances Act was passed applied only to the 
NAC and that they were about to deny an exemption to a non-Indian church. The BNDD 
distinguished the non-Indian church from the NAC because of the unique history and tradition 
of the NAC was such that there was no question that the NAC regarded peyote as a deity. 
Hearings on H.R. 11701 and H.R. 13743 before the Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce 117-18 (1970), citing United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 598-99 (D.N.D. 
1984). 
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 asserts 
that the main objective is to deal in a comprehensive manner with the growing menace of drug 
abuse in the United States, See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, 91* Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4566, 4567. See also Warner, 595 F. Supp. 598-99. 
It is clear that Congress has firmly expressed its intent to protect the American public 
from the obvious clangers of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). Congress has determined that 
the illegal distribution, possession and improper use of controlled substances has a substantial 
and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people. Id. 
Consequently, the State's interests in prohibiting the possession and distribution of peyote is 
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indeed a compelling one, in that illegal use of peyote clearly poses a "substantial threat to 
public health, safety, and welfare." 
Courts have recognized that Congress has a compelling interest in controlling the use 
of drugs that it determines to be dangerous, such as peyote, and that Congress can 
constitutionally control the use of such drugs even if those drugs are deemed to be used for 
religious purposes. United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, 
denied, 460 U.S.1051, 103 S. Ct. 1492, 75 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1983), citing United States v. 
Hudson, 431 F.2d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 1011, 91 S. Ct. 577, 27 L. 
Ed. 2d 577 (1971) (the use of drugs as part of religious practice is not constitutionally 
privileged). 
It is obvious from the above analysis that the State has a strong compelling interest in 
controlling the use of peyote and that this interest is not served by allowing an unlimited 
amount of exemptions for the bona fide use of peyote in religious ceremonies. Consequently, 
the State's compelling interest overrides the Defendants' first amendment rights to the free 
exercise of religion. 
C. EQVAh PROTECTION CLAM 
The State argues that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 
1994 (AIRFA) limits the federal exception from prosecution for members of the NAC to 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes. Defendants argue that AIRFA is inclusive and 
not exclusive and therefore does not exclude or prohibit members of non-federally recognized 
Indian tribes from using peyote in religious ceremonies, nor does it prohibit members of NAC 
from using peyote in religious ceremonies. 
Additionally, Defendants assert that there is nothing in the legislative history of 
AIRFA that evidences an indication of Congress to limit the breadth of the exception from 
prosecution for NAC members granted under 28 U.S.C. 1307.31. Defendants contend that 
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any interpretation of AIRFA restricting the rights of Native American Indians who are not 
members of a federally recognized tribe, or restricting the right of members of the NAC who 
are not members of a federally recognized tribe, to use peyote for religious purposes, clearly 
violates the equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
This Court is not persuaded by the Defendants' arguments concerning the exceptions 
as determined by AIRFA. The preference given to Indian H members" of the NAC is clearly 
not racial in nature, but political in nature. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. 
Supp. 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 1983). Congress has a power or a duty to the Indians to preserve 
their dependent nations as a cohesive culture until such time as they become so assimilated in 
the mainstream of American culture so as not to be "a people apart." Id. at 639. Congress has 
recognized this duty in AIRFA. The government furthers this policy with the exemption for 
the use of peyote in the rituals of the NAC. Id. 
Applying the rational basis test to the Defendants' equal protection claim, it is clear 
from the legislative history that religion is an integral part of the Indian culture and use of 
peyote is necessary to the survival of the Indian religion. Peyote Way, 556 F. Supp. at 637, 
citing 1978 U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News 1262 (the legislative history of the American 
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996). The United States is following the policy of 
preserving the Indians' dependent nation and culture by granting an exemption to Indians for 
the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of the NAC. See 556 F. Supp. at 639. 
Therefore, the preference given to Indians in the application of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of the State's unique obligation toward the Indians and does not 
violate Defendants' rights to equal protection. 
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The Defendants' argument that the purpose of preserving Native American culture 
that underlies ADFRA is in no way at odds with the goal of protecting members of the NAC 
using peyote for religious purposes from criminal prosecution is unavailing to this Court. 
As stated above, the United States has a vested interest and duty in preserving the Indians' 
dependent nature and culture by granting an exemption to Indians for the use of peyote in 
religious ceremonies. The United States has no such obligation to preserve the culture of non-
Indians by granting them such an exemption. 
Upon examination of the legislative history, as well as the United States' historical 
relationship with Indians, it is clear that all laws dealing with Indians have been explicitly 
designed to help them maintain and cultivate their heritage and culture. Subsequently, it 
would seem obvious that given the origin of the NAC, ordinary people would be on notice that 
an exemption to the NAC may only be an exemption for Indians. For this Court to interpret 
the exemption as to so broadly encompass any individual who is a member of a NAC, 
regardless of their heritage, would not only open the floodgates of individuals touting religious 
freedom as an exemption from prosecution for use of an illegal substance, but it would 
diminish and weaken the very purpose that the United States and Congress initially intended by 
granting such exemptions. That purpose is for the protection and furtherance of the Indian 
culture. 
It seems that the Defendants would like this Court to believe that the crux of the 
exemption for use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies is simply to uphold and protect 
the freedoms guaranteed to all individuals in the First Amendment of the Constitution. 
However, upon careful examination of the historical layers of this exemption, this Court is 
unwilling to do that. In the eyes of this Court, it is clear that the exemption from prosecution 
for use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies is limited to those individuals who are of 
Indian descent. To date, there has been no official evidence presented to this Court to show 
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that the Defendants are legitimately of Indian heritage. Nor, after presiding over the 
Preliminary Hearing in this matter, was any evidence presented to this Court that any of the 
individuals that the Defendants' were supplying peyote to had any Indian ancestry whatsoever. 
m 
RULING 
This Court denies the Defendants Motion for Dismissal in this case. 
Dated this / 2-day of September, 2001. 
BY THE/tOl 
cc: David H. T. Wayment 
Kathryn Collard 
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Addendum D 
§ 1 9 9 6 * Protection and preservation of traditional religions of 
Native Americans 
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United 
States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent 
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional 
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawai-
ians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession 
ot sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials 
and traditional rites. 
(Pub.L. 95-341, § 1, Aug. 11, 1978, 92 Stat. 469.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1978 Acts. House Report No. 95-1308, 
see 1978 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. 
News, p. 1262. 
Short Title 
1994 Amendments. Pub.L. 103-344, 
§ I, Oct. 6, 1994, 108 Stat. 3125, provid-
ed that: "This Act [enacting section 
1996a of this title] may be cited as the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
Amendments of 1994'." 
1978 Acts. Pub.L. 95-341 [enacting 
this section and the note set out under 
this section] is popularly known as the 
American Indian Religious Freedom 
Act". 
Federal Implementation of Protective 
and Preservation Functions Relating to 
Native American Religious Cultural 
Rights and Practices; Presidential Re-
port to Congress 
Section 2 of Pub.L. 95-341 provided 
that the President direct the various Fed-
eral departments, agencies, and other in-
strumentalities responsible for adminis-
tering relevant laws to evaluate their poli-
cies and procedures in consultation with 
native traditional religious leaders to de-
termine changes necessary to preserve 
Native American religious cultural rights 
and practices and report to the Congress 
12 months after Aug. 11, 1978. 
1 9 9 6 a . Traditional Indian religious use of peyote 
(a) Congressional findings and declarations 
The Congress finds and declares that— 
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of 
the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centur ies been 
integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuat ing Indian 
tribes and cultures; 
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Ind ians has 
been protected by Federal regulation; 
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are 
similar to, or are in conformance with, the Federal regulation 
which protects the ceremonial use of peyote by Indian religious 
practit ioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of 
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who partici 
pate in such religious ceremonies; 
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that 
the First Amendment does not protect Indian pract i t ioners who 
use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised uncer 
tainty whether this religious practice would be protected under 
the compelling State interest standard; and 
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the 
religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and 
marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk that 
they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment. 
fo) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, posses-
sion, or t ransportat ion of peyote by an Indian for bona fide tradit ion-
al ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a tradit ion-
al Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United 
States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discr iminated 
against on the basis of such use, possession or t ransportat ion, includ-
ing, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits u n d e r 
public assistance programs. 
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and 
registration by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those per-
sons who cultivate, harvest, or distribute peyote as may be consistent 
with the purposes of this section and section 1996 of this title. 
(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of 
section 481.111(a) of Vernon's Texas Health and Safety Code Anno-
tated, in effect on October 6, 1994, insofar as those provisions per tain 
to the cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department 
or agency, in carrying out its statutory responsibilities and functions, 
from promulgating regulations establishing reasonable limitations on 
the use or ingestion of peyote prior to or during the performance of 
duties by sworn law enforcement officers or personnel directly in-
volved in public transportat ion or any other safety-sensitive positions 
where the performance of such duties may be adversely affected by 
such use or ingestion. Such regulations shall be adopted only after 
consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for 
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. 
Any regulation promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject 
to the balancing test set forth in section 3 of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (Public Law 103-141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l) . 
(5) This section shall not be construed as requiring prison authori-
ties to permit, nor shall it be construed to prohibit prison authorities 
from permitting, access to peyote by Indians while incarcerated 
within Federal or State prison facilities. 
(6) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (Public Law 103-141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb- l ) [42 U.S.C.A. 
& 2000bb et seq.], this section shall not be construed to prohibit 
States from enacting or enforcing reasonable traffic safety laws
 0 r 
regulations. 
(7) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (Public Law 103-141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb- l ) [42 U.S.C.A 
§ 2000bb et seq.], this section does not prohibit the Secretary
 Qf 
Defense from promulgating regulations establishing reasonable limi. 
tations on the use, possession, transportation, or distribution of 
peyote to promote military readiness, safety, or compliance with 
international law or laws of other countries. Such regulations shall 
be adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional 
Indian religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to 
their practice. 
(c) Definitions 
For purposes of this section— 
(1) the term " Ind ian" means a member of an Indian tribe; 
(2) the term "Indian t r ibe" means any tribe, band, nation, 
pueblo, or other organized group or community of Indians, 
including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or established 
pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special 
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians 
because of their status as Indians; 
(3) the term "Indian religion" means any religion— 
(A) which is practiced by Indians, and 
(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a 
traditional Indian culture or community; and 
(4) the term "S ta te" means any State of the United States, and 
any political subdivision thereof. 
(d) Protection of rights of Indians and Indian tribes 
Nothing in this section jhall be construed as abrogating, diminish-
ing, or otherwise affecting— 
(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe; 
(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which 
exist under treaties, Executive orders, and laws of the United 
States; 
(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; 
and 
(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any 
Federal or State law. 
(Pub.L. 95-341, § 3, as added Pub.L. 103-344, § 2, Oct. 6, 1994, 108 Stat 
3125.) 
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H.R. REP. 103-675 
H.R. Rep. No. 675, 103RD Cong., 2ND Sess. 1994, 1994 WL 440338 (Leg.Hist.) 
(Cite as: H.R. REP. 103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404) 
*1 P.L. 103-344, **2404 AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1994 
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE 
House: August 8, 1994 
Senate: September 27, 1994 
Cong. Record Vol. 140 (1994) 
House Report (Natural Resources Committee) No. 103-675 
Aug. 5, 1994 (To accompany H.R. 4230) 
HOUSE REPORT NO. 103-675 
August 5, 1994 
[To accompany H.R. 4230] 
The Committee on Natural Resources, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 4230) to 
amend the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to provide for the traditional use 
of peyote by Indians for religious purposes, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that 
the bill as amended do pass. 
The amendment is as follows: 
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the 
following: 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments 
of 1994". 
SEC. 2. TRADITIONAL INDIAN RELIGIOUS USE OF THE PEYOTE SACRAMENT. 
The Act of August 11, 1978 (42 U.S.C. 1996), commonly referred to as the 
"American Indian Religious Freedom Act", is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
following new section: 
"Sec. 3. (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
'll) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus 
as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and 
significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures; 
"(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by 
Federal regulation; 
"(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in 
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote 
by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of 
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious 
ceremonies; 
*2 "(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not 
protect Indian practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also 
raised uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the 
compelling State interest standard; and 
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"(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of 
peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and 
cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory 
treatment. 
"(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or 
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes 
in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and 
shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be 
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or 
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable 
benefits under public assistance programs. 
"(2) This sect ion does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration 
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or 
distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this Act. 
"(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of section 
481.111(a) of Vernon's Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on the date 
of enactment of this section, insofar as those provisions pertain to the 
cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote. 
"(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department or agency, in 
carrying out its statutory responsibilities and functions, from promulgating 
regulations establishing reasonable time limitations on the use or ingestion of 
peyote prior to performance of official duties by active duty military personnel, 
sworn law enforcement officers, or personnel directly involved in public 
transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions where the performance of such 
duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion, nor shall this section 
prohibit affected departments or agencies from establishing reasonable limitations 
on the transportation of peyote on military bases or overseas. Such regulations 
shall be adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian 
religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. Any 
regulation promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject to the balancing 
test set forth in section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103-
141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l). 
"(c) For purposes of this section-
"(1) the term 'Indian' means a member of an Indian tribe; 
"(2) the term 'Indian tribe' means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other 
organized group or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village {as 
defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and 
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as 
Indians; 
"(3) the term 'Indian religion' means any religion-
"(A) which is practiced by Indians, and 
"(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian 
culture or community; and 
"(4) the term 'State' means any State of the United States, and any political 
subdivision thereof. 
"(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or 
otherwise affecting-
"(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe; 
"(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which exist under 
treaties, executive orders, and laws of the United States; 
"(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; and 
"(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any Federal or State 
law.". 
••2404 PURPOSE 
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The purpose of H.R. 4230 is to amend the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to 
provide for the traditional use of peyote by Indians for religious purposes, and for 
other purposes. 
*3 BACKGROUND AND NEED 
Peyote, the scientific name of which is Lophophora williamsii, is a small, 
spineless cactus that grows only in the Rio Grande valley of southern Texas and 
northern Mexico. Anthropologists date the sacramental use of the peyote cactus among 
indigenous peoples back 10,000 years. Native American religious use of peyote was 
discovered by Spanish explorers in the 1600's and has continued to the present. Such 
use exists today, largely through the Native American Church (NAC), among more than 
50 Indian tribes in the United States. The NAC is the present-day embodiment of one 
of the oldest religious traditions in the western hemisphere. The contemporary NAC 
was first incorporated in Oklahoma in 1918, and **2405 now has chapters in 25 
States. Approximately 250,000 American Indians are affiliated with the NAC. 
The Federal District Court in New Mexico, in the 1986 case of Toledo v. Nobel-
Sysco, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.M. 1986) held that the religious use of peyote was 
not illegal. The court found that: 
Church peyote users believe that peyote is a sacred and powerful plant. Peyote 
is seen as a medicine, a protector, and a teacher. In terms used by other religions, 
peyote can be called a sacrament, something which when eaten gives awareness of God. 
The use of peyote is central to the Native American peyote religion. The religion 
teaches that those who use peyote must not use alcohol. It encourages love of 
parents and obedience to parents, fidelity to a spouse, and charity towards others. 
The peyote religion does not prohibit members from also practicing other religions. 
Medical evidence, based on scientific studies and opinions of scientific and other 
experts, including medical doctors, former directors of the Indian Health Service 
and Enthropologists, clearly demonstrates peyote is not injurious to the Indian 
religious user, and, in fact, is often helpful in controlling alcoholism and alcohol 
abuse among Indian people. Ingested as a solid or tea in strictly prescribed and 
controlled religious ceremonies, the sacrament is neither addictive nor habit 
forming. Courts which have made factual findings regarding the religious use of 
peyote by Indians have concluded that such use is not harmful. 
While the First Amendment right of Indian practitioners of the peyote religion is 
endangered by the Smith decision, its religious use is basically non-controversial. 
Attempts by the Congress to recognize and protect this right have a long history. 
When the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2, which became the "Drug Abuse 
Control Amendments of 1965", it protected the right of Indians to use peyote in 
connection with the ceremonies of a certified religious organization. The Senate 
omitted that specific protection, preferring that substances be included on such a 
list on a case-by-case basis. Congressman Harris assured House members that such 
omissions would not prevent bona fide religious use because courts had already 
upheld peyote use as a First Amendment right. The Administration then added peyote 
to Schedule I by administrative *4 regulation in 1966, but provided an exemption for 
non-drug use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the Native American Church. 
When Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, it enacted Schedule I 
into law. During hearings on the legislation, Congressman Satterfield expressed 
concern that the religious use of peyote by Indian practitioners be protected. The 
Administration assured him that this would be taken care of by regulation. The 
regulations, adopted in 1971 to implement the Act, provide at 21 CFR S 1307.31: 
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to 
the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American 
Church. 
**2406 Since that time, Native American Church use of peyote as a religious 
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sacrament has had the limited protection of Federal regulation. Officials of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice testified at House 
hearings in 1993 and 1994 that the religious use of peyote by Indians has nothing to 
do with the vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country. 
The DEA further testified that it is unaware of the diversion of peyote to any 
illicit market. The NAC has a good, cooperative relationship with the DEA in 
ensuring that peyote is lawfully harvested and distributed solely for American 
Indian religious use. The distribution of peyote is strictly controlled by Federal 
regulations, and by the laws and regulations of the State of Texas, the only State 
in which the sacrament grows in significant quantities. 
In addition to the Federal regulatory exemption of the DEA, 28 States provide some 
degree of legal protection for the religious use of peyote by Indians. However, 
neither the Federal regulation nor the State laws provide the full range of 
protection needed for the unhindered religious use of peyote by Indians, and 22 
States still have no legal protection at all. In some States, the legal protection 
for Indians is limited to the opportunity to assert the religious use of peyote as 
an affirmative defense in the context of felony prosecution. Thus, bona fide NAC 
members can be arrested, finger-printed, incarcerated and subjected to all the 
indignities of a felony prosecution before they can be vindicated and set free. Even 
then, they will have a criminal record-simply for practicing a bona fide religion 
that predates the founding of this country by some 10,000 years. 
As a result of the diverse State laws governing the use of peyote, Indians in 
different tribes from different States, as well as from different tribes within some 
States, are treated differently regarding the traditional religious use of peyote. 
[FN1] NAC members who have *5 lawfully acquired the sacrament in Texas can still be 
arrested and subjected to felony prosecution and imprisonment in 22 States, States 
in which they may live or through which they must travel on their way home from 
Texas after lawfully acquiring the sacrament. This current State-by-State patchwork 
of laws has a chilling effect on the freedom of many Indian people to travel in this 
country and to practice their religion. Legislation is therefore needed to assure 
comprehensive, equal and uniform protection of the religious use of peyote by 
Indians throughout the United States, without regard to the State or reservation of 
residence, or tribal affiliation. 
**2407 While 28 States do provide varying legal protections for the religious use 
of peyote by Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1990 in the Smith case that it 
is constitutionally permissible for States to prohibit such use. This legislation is 
made necessary by the Smith ruling. 
THE SMITH DECISION AND RESTORATION OF THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST TEST 
The Smith case began as an unemployment compensation dispute involving Alfred 
Smith, a Native American employee of a private drug and alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. Smith was fired and denied unemployment benefits after acknowledging he 
had ingested the peyote sacrament during a traditional religious ceremony of the 
Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division believed that the State had a 
compelling interest in proscribing the use of certain drugs pursuant to a controlled 
substance law. 
Smith filed a case disputing the denial of unemployment benefits and questioning 
the constitutionality of the controlled substance law as it applied to his religious 
practice. Following protracted litigation, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the 
prohibition on the sacramental use of peyote violated the free exercise clause of 
the First Amendment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment did not prohibit the State of Oregon from banning the sacramental 
use of peyote through its general criminal prohibition laws, or from denying 
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs for such religiously 
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inspired use. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy), the Court discarded the long-
standing compelling interest test, holding that facially neutral laws of general 
applicability that burden the free exercise of religion require no special 
justification to satisfy free exercise scrutiny. 
Finally, the Court asserted that the free exercise of religion may be protected 
through the political process. According to the majority, its inability to find 
constitutional protection for religiously inspired action burdened by generally 
applicable laws does not mean statutory exemptions to such laws are not permitted or 
even desired. However, the majority noted: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that *6 unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which 
judges weight the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all 
religious beliefs. [FN2] 
To reach its decision, the majority had to strain its reading of the First 
Amendment and ignore years of precedent in which the compelling government interest 
test was applied in a variety of circumstances. In a strongly worded concurrence, 
Justice O'Connor took sharp issue with the Court's abandonment of the compelling 
government interest test. Justice O'Connor reviewed the Court's **2408 precedents 
and found that they confirmed that the compelling interest standard is the 
appropriate means to protect the religious liberty guaranteed by the First 
Amendment: 
To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does 
not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct. Under our 
established First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to 
act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute. Instead, we have respected 
both the First Amendment's express textual mandate and the governmental interest in 
regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial burden 
on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. [FN3] 
This controversial decision by a divided Court has been heavily criticized by 
constitutional law scholars, religious leaders, and civil libertarians. In 1993, 
Congress overturned portions of the Smith decision by enacting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (42 U.S.C. S S 2000bb 
et seq.,). However, RFRA left open the question of whether the reinstated compelling 
government interest test would provide adequate legal protection for the traditional 
religious use of peyote by American Indians-the precise religious practice at issue 
in Smith. As President Clinton emphasized when he signed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act on November 16, 1993: 
The agenda for restoration of religious freedom in America will not be complete 
until traditional Native American religious practices have received the protection 
they deserve. My Administration has been and will continue to work actively with 
Native Americans and the Congress on legislation to address these concerns. 
NEED FOR H.R. 4230 NOTWITHSTANDING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 
1993 
The Committee recognizes that H.R. 4230 remains necessary notwithstanding the 
recent enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Justice O'Connor 
agreed with the judgment of the majority in Smith that Oregon's prohibition of the 
sacramental use of peyote was constitutionally permissible. However, she thought it 
unnecessary to discard the compelling government interest *7 test in order to reach 
this result. Instead, Justice O'Connor would have retained and applied the 
traditional test to rule that the religious use of peyote by Indians is not 
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protected by the first Amendment, since in her view the "State in this case has a 
compelling interest in regulating peyote use by its citizens- + + *" [FN4] In Justice 
O'Connor's view, Oregon would have met the compelling government interest test 
solely on the judgment of the State legislature to list peyote as a Class 1 
controlled substance, and notwithstanding factual considerations. 
**2409 The Supreme Court's reliance on Oregon's position in Smith that the State 
has an interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens from the 
"dangers" of peyote is highly questionable. As pointed out by Justice Blackmun in 
his dissent in Smith, Oregon's position "rests on no evidentiary foundation at all," 
and is therefore "entirely speculative". [FN5J As underscored by the dissent, the 
majority agreed with Oregon's assertion, notwithstanding that Oregon failed to offer 
any "evidence that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed anyone." [FN6] To 
the contrary, the record in Smith amply showed that: [FN7] 
(1) Factual findings of other courts contradict Oregon's assumption that the 
religious use of peyote is harmful; 
(2) Medical evidence, based on the opinion of scientists and other experts, 
including medical doctors and anthropologists, is that peyote is not injurious; 
(3) The distribution and use of peyote has nothing to do with the vast and 
violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country; 
(4) There is virtually no illegal trafficking in peyote-Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) data indicates that between 1980 and 1987, only 19.4 pounds of 
peyote was confiscated, while during the same period the DEA seized over 15 million 
pounds of marijuana; 
(5) The distribution of peyote is strictly controlled by Federal and Texas State 
regulations-the only State where peyote grows in significant quantities; 
(6) The carefully circumscribed religious context in which peyote is used by 
Indians is far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of 
unlawful drugs, and is similar to the sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic 
Church, which was exempted from the general statutory ban on possession and use of 
alcohol during Prohibition; 
(7) The Federal Government and 23 States [now 28] provide an exemption from 
respective drug laws for the religious use of peyote by American Indians; 
(8) Native American Church doctrine forbids the non-religious use of peyote, and 
also advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility and abstinence from alcohol; 
(9) Spiritual and social support provided by the Native American Church has been 
effective in combatting the tragic effects of alcoholism among the Native American 
population; 
*8 (10) Oregon's assertion that granting a religious exemption for the use of 
peyote would open the floodgates to claims for the religious use of controlled 
substances by other religious denominations is not an issue because the Supreme 
Court and lower courts over the years have consistently rejected similar arguments 
in past free exercise cases, having held that the religious use of peyote by 
American Indians is the sole circumstance**2410 warranting claims for a religious 
exemption for any controlled substance; and 
(11) granting a religious exemption solely for the sacramental use of peyote by 
American Indians presents no equal protection problems. 
Notwithstanding the above-referenced record in Smith, Justice O'Connor felt Oregon 
had a compelling interest to prohibit the religious use of peyote, even though 
Oregon had never evinced a concrete interest in enforcing its drug laws against 
religious users of peyote-including Al Smith, the plaintiff in the Smith case. The 
committee recognizes that traditional Indian religions, including the peyote 
religion, are highly unique in nature and are little understood by the courts and 
other government officials. Given this backdrop, the Committee believes that the 
traditional religious use of the peyote sacrament by Indians requires statutory 
protection. H.R. 4230 responds to the Supreme Court's invitation in Smith to 
accommodate this ancient religious practice through the political process. 
Absent Federal legislation, the question of whether a given State has a compelling 
interest to prohibit the religious use of peyote by Indians is one that would 
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necessarily be determined by the courts on a State-by-State basis. The Committee 
recognizes that such determination could require numerous State supreme court 
decisions and a corresponding number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions-with varying 
results possible, as well as numerous lower State and Federal court decisions. Such 
piecemeal judicial resolution to this issue is not likely to produce uniform, just 
or equal results, and would be unduly burdensome, costly and time consuming. The 
Committee recognizes that uniform and equal protection of Indians without regard to 
State or reservation of residence, or tribal affiliation, can only be accomplished 
by Congress through comprehensive legislation. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Since the creation of the United States, the treaty relationship between Indian 
tribes and the United States government has engendered a long-standing political 
relationship under the Constitution. This relationship includes a Federal trust 
responsibility for Indian tribes which has resulted in hundreds of separate Federal 
statutes dealing with all aspects of Indian life, including health, education, 
religion, economic development, children, employment, language and culture, gaming, 
and a host of other subject matter areas. An entire title of the United States Code 
(25 U.S.C.) is devoted exclusively to Indian legislation. 
Because Indians and Indian tribes occupy a sui generis legal status in Federal law 
under the U.S. Constitution and enjoy a special political relationship with the 
United States Government, separate *9 Indian legislation has consistently been 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court under the legal principles set forth in Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974). At the urging of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the long-standing rationale for special Indian treatment by the Federal 
Government was recently applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the 
religious use of peyote in Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 
(5th Cir. 1991). Finding that the Native American Church (NAC) members were also 
members of federally recognized tribes,**2411 the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of the DEA's protective regulation against an equal protection 
challenge: 
We hold that the federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native Americans to 
continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American culture. Such 
preservation is fundamental to the Federal Government's trust relationship with 
tribal Native Americans. Under Morton, [non-Indians] are not similarly situated to-
NAC [members] for purposes of cultural preservation and thus, the Federal Government 
may exempt NAC members from statutes prohibiting possession of peyote without 
extending the exemption to [non- Indians]. [FN8] 
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that the DEA exemption for NAC members did not 
violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment: 
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the Federal Government and Native 
American Indian tribes precludes the degree of separation of church and state 
ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The Federal Government cannot at once 
fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal Native Americans and apply 
conventional separatist understandings of the establishment clause to that 
relationship. 
***Thus, we hold that the Federal NAC exemption represents the Government's 
protection of the culture of quasi-sovereign Native American tribes and as such, 
does not represent an establishment of religion in contravention of the First 
Amendment. [FN9] 
Based on the special relationship between the United States and federally 
recognized tribes, and on Peyote Way Church of God, the U.S. Department of Justice 
testified that Congress has the requisite authority to enact H.R. 4230, and that it 
is constitutionally sound. Accordingly, the Committee is confident that the granting 
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of a statutory religious exemption for the sacramental use of peyote solely by 
American Indians presents no equal protection or establishment clause problems, and 
therefore stands on a solid constitutional footing. 
*10 COMMITTEE AMENDMENT 
The Committee Amendment to H.R. 4230 provides that Federal departments or agencies 
are not prohibited from promulgating regulations establishing reasonable time 
limitations on the use or ingestion **2412 of peyote prior to performance of 
official duties by active military personnel, sworn law enforcement officers, or 
personnel directly involved in public safety or safety-sensitive positions where the 
performance of such duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion. While 
the committee is unaware of any such problems in the past, it intends to accommodate 
prospective concerns articulated principally by the Department of Transportation and 
Department of Defense. 
An official of the Native American Church testified at the June 10, 1994 hearing 
of the Native American Affairs Subcommittee that the effects of peyote do not 
persist more than 6 hours. The Committee recognizes the medical literature and 
related studies indicate that mescaline, the psychoactive component of peyote, may 
persist in the brain for up to 9 to 10 hours, [FN10] and that the physiological 
effects of peyote can last up to 12 hours. [FN11] The committee therefore deems a 
period of 6 to 24 hours to be "reasonable" as to authorized time limitations 
regarding the use or ingestion of peyote, pursuant to regulations the departments or 
agencies may promulgate under H.R. 4230. The committee further believes that, where 
an agency proposes a time limitation exceeding 24 hours, it should be prepared to 
show such limitation meets the balancing test set forth in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. The Committee is confident that the bill and the 6 to 24 hour range 
for time limitations will adequately and amply meet the needs of affected 
departments, and will not adversely impact the ability of U.S. military personnel, 
law enforcement officers or persons directly involved in positions related to public 
safety to maintain good order, discipline, security and safety. 
The Committee does not intend the act to impose requirements that would exacerbate 
the difficult and complex challenges of operating the Nation's prisons and jails in 
a safe and secure manner. Accordingly, the Committee does not intend the Act to 
require prison officials to either prescribe or proscribe the religious use of 
peyote by Indian inmates. Rather, the Committee expects that these matters will be 
addressed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and that the courts 
will continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise 
of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary rules and procedures to 
maintain good order, security and discipline. 
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE 
Section 1 provides that the Act may be cited as the "American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994". 
**2413 *11 SECTION 2. TRADITIONAL INDIAN RELIGIOUS USE OF THE PEYOTE 
SACRAMENT 
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Section 2 amends the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 by adding a new 
"Section 3" as follows: 
Subsection (a) provides the findings of the Congress. 
Subsection (b)(1) provides that the use, possession or transportation of peyote by 
an Indian for ceremonial purposes is lawful and is not to be prohibited by the 
United States or any State Government. It further provides that no Indian is to be 
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of the use, possession or 
transportation of peyote and benefits under public assistance programs are not to be 
denied. 
Subection (b)(2) provides that this section does not prohibit the regulation and 
registration by the Drug Enforcement Administration of persons who cultivate, 
harvest or distribute peyote under this Act. 
Subsection (b)(3) provides that this section is not to impact a Texas law 
governing the growing and distribution of peyote. 
Subsection (b)(4) provides that departments or agencies are not prohibited from 
promulgating regulations establishing reasonable time limitations on the use or 
ingestion of peyote prior to the performance of official duties by certain 
personnel. This subsection also provides that affected departments or agencies are 
not prohibited from establishing reasonable limitations on the transportation of 
peyote on military bases or overseas. The regulations are to be adopted only after 
consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for which the 
sacramental use of peyote is integral. 
Subsection (c) provides for definitions for terms used in this section. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
H.R. 4230 was introduced by Representatives Richardson on April 14, 1994. The 
Subcommittee on Native American Affairs held a hearing on H.R. 4230 on June 10, 
1994. The Subcommittee considered and unanimously passed a substitute amendment to 
H.R. 4230, which was reported to the Committee on Natural Resources. On July 27, 
1994, the Committee on Natural Resources considered H.R. 4230 and ordered it to be 
reported to the House with an amendment. 
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Committee on Natural Resources, by voice vote, approved the bill with 
amendments and recommends its enactment by the House. 
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED 
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as 
follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman): 
•12 SECTION 3 OF THE ACT OF AUGUST 11, 1978 
(POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEEDOM ACT) 
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Sec. 3. (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus 
as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and 
significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures; 
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by 
Federal regulation; 
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in 
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote 
by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of 
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious 
ceremonies; 
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not protect Indian 
practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised 
uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the compelling 
State interest standard; and 
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of 
peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and 
cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory 
treatment. 
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or 
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes 
in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and 
shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be 
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or 
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable 
benefits under public assistance programs. 
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration 
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or 
distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this Act. 
(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of section 
481.111(a) of Vernon's Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on the date 
of enactment of this section, insofar as those provisions pertain to the 
cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department or agency, in 
carrying out its statutory responsibilities and functions, from promulgating 
regulations establishing reasonable time limitations on the use or ingestion of 
peyote prior to performance of official duties by active duty military personnel, 
sworn law enforcement officers, or personnel directly involved in public 
transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions where the performance of such 
duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion, nor shall this section 
prohibit affected departments or agencies from establishing reasonable limitations 
on the transportation of peyote on *13 military bases or overseas. Such regulations 
shall be adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian 
religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. Any 
regulation promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject to the balancing 
test set forth in section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103-
141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l). 
(c) For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "Indian" means a member of an Indian tribe; 
(2) the term "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other 
organized group or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as 
defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and 
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as 
Indians; 
(3) the term "Indian religion" means any religion- -
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(A) which is practiced by Indians, and 
(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian 
culture or community; and 
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, and any political 
subdivision thereof. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or 
otherwise affecting-
(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe; 
(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which exist under 
treaties, executive orders, and laws of the United States; 
(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; and 
(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any Federal or State 
law. 
**2414 OVERSIGHT STATEMENT 
The Committee on Natural Resources will have continuing responsibility for 
oversight of the implementation of H.R. 4230 after enactment. No reports or 
recommendations were received pursuant to rule X, clause 2 of the rules of the House 
of Representatives. 
INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT 
Enactment of H.R. 4230 will have no inflationary impact. 
COST AND BUDGET ACT COMPLIANCE 
The cost and budgetary analysis of H.R. 4230, as evaluated by the Congressional 
Budget Office is set forth below: 
*14 U.S. Congress, 
Congressional Budget Office, 
Washington, DC, August 3, 1994. 
Hon. George Miller, 
Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources, 
House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed H.R. 4230, the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, as ordered reported by the 
House Committee on Natural Resources on July 27, 1994. We estimate the 
implementation of the bill would have no effect on the Federal budget or on the 
budgets of State or local governments. Enactment of H.R. 4230 would not affect 
direct spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to 
this bill. 
H.R. 4230 would amend the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 by adding 
a new section that would permit the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by 
Indians for sacramental purposes. However, the bill would not prohibit the Drug 
Enforcement Administration from regulating peyote cultivation or distribution, nor 
would it prohibit Federal agencies from regulating peyote use by certain types of 
Federal personnel prior to performing their official duties. 
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. 
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The CBO staffcontact is Rachel A. Robertson. 
Sincerely, 
James T. Blum, 
(For Robert D. Reischauer) . 
U.S. Department of Justice, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Washington, DC, August 3, 1994. 
Mr. Tadd Johnson, 
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Native American Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Washington, DC. 
Dear Mr. Johnson: It is my understanding that H.R. 4230, "American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act of 1994", is nearing floor **2415 consideration in the House. 
You will recall that while the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was unable to 
have a witness at your hearing regarding this matter on June 10, 1994, that we did 
submit a statement for the record. That statement succinctly puts forth the history 
of DEA's regulation of peyote and the exemption for its use in traditional Native 
American ceremonies. DEA has encountered no problems with the use of peyote in these 
traditional ceremonies nor has diversion of peyote been a problem. 
DEA has had a long and cooperative association with the Native American Church, 
working with them since the early 1970's to assure that our mutual concerns 
relating to peyote are met. We have worked with its representatives to assure that 
the bill language effectively addresses these matters. DEA supports the passage of 
H.R. 4230 as it was reported by the Committee on Natural Resources with the 
amendments that address public safety concerns. 
*15 If I can provide you with any other information pertaining to DEA's experience 
regarding peyote, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
David A. Melocik, 
DEA, Congressional Affairs. 
STATEMENT OF GENE R. HAISLIP, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF 
DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
Chairman Richardson and Members of the Subcommittee: 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) appreciates the opportunity to comment 
regarding H.R. 4230 "American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1994." This bill seeks 
to statutorily provide for the traditional use of peyote by Indians for religious 
purposes. 
Almost 25 years ago when Congress began hearings pertaining to the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) they decided that the traditional, historic use of peyote by 
members of the Native American Church (NAC) as a sacrament in traditional religious 
ceremonies warranted a specific exemption. Congress determined, to be consistent 
with past Federal practice, this exemption should be specified in regulation rather 
in law. Consequently, an exception was created for the NAC to use peyote for 
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religious purposes. Although the NAC is not defined in the subject regulations, the 
members of this church are required to be Native American. 
The regulation has worked very well for both DEA and the NAC with only minor 
difficulties from time to time concerning the natural supply of the drug and the 
difficulties obtaining peyote outside of the area where it grows locally. In fact, 
our experience over the years in enforcing this regulation has revealed no 
particular problems of abuse of this substance by the NAC or its members. 
Unfortunately there will always be individuals who seek to circumvent the 
regulations for their own purposes and on occasion, DEA has dealt with groups who 
have attempted to expand the exemption to authorize the use of peyote or other 
controlled substances in what they claimed to be religious ceremonies. 
**2416 On occasion, peyote, who primary active ingredient is mescaline, a 
hallucinogen similar to LSD, has been found in the illicit traffic. It has not been 
reported by DEA, State or local enforcement agencies to be anything other than a 
sporadic problem. Despite the fact that the regulation allows for the legal use of 
the drug and the registration of legitimate distributors, DEA at this time is not 
aware of the diversion of the drug to any illicit market. 
Although we at DEA feel that the regulation that has been in place for almost 25 
years has worked well, we would prefer a statutory exemption over an administrative 
exemption. We have reviewed H.R. 4230 and could support the bill if amended to: (1) 
restrict the use, possession, or transportation of peyote to bona fide traditional 
ceremonial purposes only; and (2) to make clarifying amendments to address public 
safety concerns. 
DEA and the NAC have maintained a close working relationship to allow the use of 
peyote for religious ceremony without diversion or abuse. DEA believes the passage 
of this legislation will serve to *16 strengthen the uniform application throughout 
all of the states without reprisal to NAC members of this religious exception. 
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any 
questions that you may have. 
FN1 For example, there are three Indian reservations in Nebraska where Native 
Americans reside: the Winnebago, Omaha and Santee Sioux. Nebraska state law does not 
provide for an exemption for the religious use of peyote by Indians. Therefore, 
Native American Church members transporting the sacrament to any of the three 
Nebraska reservations could be arrested, prosecuted and incarcerated if caught in 
possession of the sacrament anywhere in the state before they enter the reservation. 
As a result of Federal Indian policy and related jurisdictional matters, the State 
of Nebraska does not have criminal jurisdiction over the Winnebago or Omaha 
reservations, but does have such authority over the Santee Sioux Reservation. Thus, 
Omaha and Winnebago Indians may lawfully use peyote for religious purposes on their 
own reservations, because state law is not applicable there and such use is 
protected by the federal exemption of the DEA. However, Indians using the sacrament 
on the Santee Sioux Reservation could be prosecuted under state law since Nebraska 
criminal law is applicable at Santee and there is no state law exemption for the 
religious use of the sacrament. Such anomalous situations are not uncommon and 
underscore the need for a uniform national law that will provide American Indians 
with equal protection throughout the nation. 
FN2 494 U.S. at 890. 
FN3 Id. at 894 (citations omitted). 
FN4 494 U.S. at 907. 
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FN5 494 U.S. at 911. 
FN6 494 U.S. at 911-12. 
FN7 494 U.S. at 911-18 for precise citations of the enumerated paragraphs. 
FN8 Id. at 1216. 
FN9 Id. at 1217. 
FN10 See e.g., Oakley and Ksir, "Drugs, Society and Human Behavior," Times 
Mirror/Mosby, St. Louis, 1990, pp. 309-311. 
FN11 See e.g., Dorrance, Janiger, and Teplitz, "Effect of Peyote on Human 
Chromosomes-Cytogenetic Study of the Huichol Indians of Northern Mexico," "Journal 
of the American Medical Association," Vol. 234, No. 3, October 20, 1975, pp. 299-
302. 
H.R. REP. 103-675, H.R. Rep. No. 675, 103RDCong., 2ND Sess. 1994, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2404, 1994 WL 440338 (Leg.Hist.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Attorn 
9 Exchange Place, Suiu 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8-
Tel: (801) 537-5625 
n* Utah 
v i n n i N COLJ 
or Defendants 
DICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE Oi 1 .H 
7' 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS INFORMATION 
v. 
JAMES W. MOONEY 
aka: James W.F.E. Mooney 
7592 South 3200 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
DOB: 01/03/19444 
Case No. 001404536 
Mttt 
and 
LINDA T MOONEY 
aka: Linda B.H.W. Mooney 
"""^ South 3200 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
I .\oe 4- .M«**T 'itrtt> 
and 
- . .hvuttiAEARrhWALKS 
.\ A FIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 
OF UTAH, INC., 
Case No. 001404538 
Judge 44afdirrg-Sr- Ifrtt 
Defendants. OTN 
Defendants, by and through counsel, hereby submit the following Memorandum 
In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information in the above referenced 
actions. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Defendants James and Linda Mooney are members and spiritual leaders of 
the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc. and have been since the 
creation of the Church in April, 1997. 
2. Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., 
is a domestic, non-profit corporation in good standing and authorized to conduct business 
in the State of Utah, by the Utah Department of Commerce. The Church was incorporated 
on April 11, 1997. See, Defendants1 Exhibit 11, attached. The Church issues cards to its 
members stating the principles of the Church. See, Defendants' Exhibit 12, attached. 
3. The defendants are being charged in the Informations in the above-
entitled actions with criminal activity based upon their possession, use and distribution of 
peyote medicine for bona fide religious purposes as members of the defendant Native 
American Church. 
4. James and Linda Mooney have been dedicated to bringing to Native 
American religion to inmates at the Central Utah Correctional Facility as volunteers. 
5. James Mooney began volunteering his services as a Seminole medicine 
man at CUCF beginning in 1991. He has received commendations for CUCF officials for 
his services to that institution. See, Defendants* Exhibit 2, attached. 
2 
6. In recognition of his outstanding volunteer services in providing Native 
Americ.iii in-li " • """ 'i i i in MHIHU I ill l I '< ul.nn I ihn;\ Muoney receiv ed the 
Citizens Awar~ or L ommendation from Governor Michael I eavitt, and 0 . Lane 
McCot te- Exi i.11 in! i II.III I irpajlinciil n| t orrections, on September 10, 1993. 
Set l'> • i • 3. attached. 
7. Ln - J .. oney was authorized by the Principal Chief of the 
Oklevueha Band of Seminole Indians to work for the Tribe by conducting swo.ti 1< - UM* 
and counseling in drug and alcohol, and also as a pipe carrier, for inmates in the Utah 
State Prison System. See, Defendants' Exhibit 4, attache! 
8. For several years prior to October " 'VJ. defendant Mrone\ u.-rkv-i 
with the Hurricane City Police T^ 
control the illegal drug problerr - \/it city and also received commendation from I ynn 
L. Excell, Chief nt Pnln f I HI iiln llin In i niiiiihiiiiuns tu tin t il r 
in this capacity. See, Defendants1 Exhibit 5, attached. 
" Hi'". J IM I In * 'fiijiM! Hiding \ nlnniLLi u uik in bunging Native American 
religious services to inmates at CUCF, defendant James Mooney was recruited by prison 
offieuL i -i impL)1. i.ttiJ .i.l ..*-.* ..o; Program", a program which -
was highly successful in reducing recid-Ai^rr among c\ i rp inmates. Defendant James 
:\ ,i! .mi win tiogiiiliuij In ;> succes^iu; .Laau_>rup m this position. See, 
idanf E\hifn* V y 
iiiivji n^ as a police officer through the 
State of Tf **h Department of Public Safety Peace Officers Standards and Training. w 1 id , 
he completed in September, 1994. See, Defendants' Exhibit 6, attached. 
3 
11. On July 25, 1994, defendant James Mooney was honored as a member of 
the CUCF transition team with an award of the Medal of Merit by 0. Lane McCotter, 
Executive Director, Utah Department of Corrections. See, Defendants' Exhibit 7, 
attached. 
12. Linda Mooney also served as a volunteer in the Native American services 
program to inmates at the CUCF facility. See. Defendants' Exhibit 10, attached. 
13. Prior to April, 1997, when he founded the defendant Oklevueha 
Earthwalks Native American Church, defendant James Mooney was a member of the 
Defendant James Mooney has previously been a member of the Native American Church 
of North America. See, Defendants' Exhibit 6, attached. 
14. The defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church, Inc., and 
defendant James Mooney are recognized by the Texas Department of Public Safety as 
having a right to receive peyote for bona fide religious purposes. See, Defendants' 
Exhibit 13, attached. 
15. For several years, prior to the subject criminal prosecutions, defendant 
James Mooney has been legally authorized to receive peyote from Salvadore Johnson, an 
individual licensed to distribute peyote to Native American Churches and their medicine 
men and all such sales are shown by receipts issued by the Department of Public Safety 
Narcotics Services. See, Defendants' Exhibit 14, attached. 
16. The Code of Federal Regulations, 21 CFR 1307.31 contains an exemption 
from criminal prosecution for the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious 
ceremonies of the Native American Church and members of the Native American Church 
are exempt from registration. See, Defendants' Exhibit 15, attached. 
4 
17. 1 .* VJL. .^li* Oi >\L Native American. 
Church Is Incorporated in 1 Itah law, specifically Chapter 37, Sect ion 58-37-! et ">CM| S I \ 
DIE fei id. mi its' ' ExI : .it it 16, attached. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS HAVE A RIGHT TO POSSESS, USE AND DISTRIBUTE 
PEYOTE FOR BONA FIDE RELIGIOUS PURPOSES AS MEMBERS OF THE 
DEFENDANT NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
AND I AWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF UTAH 
I. ian Law incorporates The Federal Exemption For r^e Of Peyote By 
Members Of the Native American Church 
Section. 58-37-1.1: tteji n. * tah t 'ode Ann. (1953), as amended 1.997, provides that 
, ' " - i i . Schedules I II, III, I \ or 
\ of Section 5b-J *-4. and also include, a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, 
III II" " il tl I en If i ,II I mi i in  mi 11 ill i, r! Substances Act, 11111 III II1" I Ml- -i | ., or any 
controlled substance analog "", 
Scimon ">K-3"" 4u"nanil SJieJJe I , pru\idts dial '! uless specifically excepted 
or unless listed on another schedule" am I lii) 
(V) peyote, meaning all parts of the plant presently c 
classified botanically as Lophorophora williamsii Lei: _ 
whether growing or not, the seeds thereof, any extrac; i 
any part of such plant, and every compound. ma-.ufactuR 
salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such - x~\ 
its seeds or extracts (Interprets 21 U ^ ' Q''" % 5 -
1(0(12). 
1 he Drug Enforcement Regulation pertaining to the listing of peyote as a 
controlled substance under Scheiliih I nl llu1 IMIIMI ('iiiiinilluii SIIIUJIJIUL.I ,ui 1 
5 
C.F.R. 1307.31, provides a special exception to prosecution for possession or use of 
peyote by members of the Native American Church: 
"SPECIAL EXEMPT PERSONS". 
Native American Church. The listing of peyote as a controlled substance 
under federal law does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the 
Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from registration. 
Because the use of peyote for bona fide religious purposes by members of the 
Native American Church is "specifically excepted" from prosecution under Schedule I of 
the federal Controlled Substances Act, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 1307.31", and Schedule 1 
of the federal Controlled Substances Act is incorporated under the definition of 
"controlled substances" in 58-37-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended 1997, Utah law 
incorporates and recognizes the federal exception for the use of peyote for bona fide 
religious purposes by members of the Native American Church. 
Utah's incorporation of the federal peyote exemption is also consistent with the 
guarantees of religious freedom proclaimed in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah, which provides 
Religious Liberty — The right of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test 
shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or 
for any vote any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a 
witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. 
There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its functions. No public money 
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person 
to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this constitution. 
6 
1 .... .,,fr v ^ cwn:>uutio..u; provision implements the m.andate in the Utah 
Enabling Act, that "Perfect tolerance of religious sHitinitTii "II Ill he .UIIK'II ami ilui no 
inJiabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or 
her mode of religious worship " M liinm ill <\iiiulf I \i\ funii I ml ilu 11 LJLJI I unstiiution 
guarantees the right of Utah residents ' to worship according to the dictates of their own 
consciences" aim] \ n n l r III |u n11-«, lm " i in tn i t Iruii mi I religious sentiment and 
unmolested religious worship." 
RaMil ii|inii ilu in nil L'uiiii ilu ii,HL njjniii! demonstrate any "compelling state 
interest" in enforcing Utah criminal laws against the Defendants where such laws 
t'lnl'iai t® ilu IINII'I.II ri'leiii|MnHi limn criminal prosecution for peyote use by members of 
:v rlaintir: Native American Church, regardless of their race. Churcn < 
• 1QQ" (holding that an interest served by statute 15 
statutory framework permits derogation of that interest ) 
II. Vny Racially Restrictive Application Of 'I he Federal Peyote Exemption 
Incorporated in the Utah Statute Violates The First Amendment 
Basv . ;w«w.ut peyote exemption, the court in I J.S. 
v. BoyiL 7"- ^ I'D \t*\\ M-*»ir. 1 ^ ), the court; specifically rejected fk 
Go v: .. • • • :. r . it that the exemption applied only to Indian members of the Native 
American Church I :v . ^rt ^^wv**^- the legislative history ot in * 
.: ...;.. *& ;:.u; >t supported the court's racially neutral interpretation of the 
exemption o;*:.r.; 
Had th< m to exclude non-Indian members, 
as the T — -><?, the language of the exemption 
would nave >u *.__ ided Indeed, the ^ i - .' - -\ 
7 . ' . 
exemption makes no reference whatsoever to a racial 
exclusion, 
A* at 1388. 
In Boyll, the court specifically also held that 21 C.F.R. 1307.31 is "specifically 
directed to religious practices" and therefore not within the ambit of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) ("Smith"), which 
elected to abandon the compelling interest test in cases 
involving a "neutral, generally applicable criminal law" 
reasoning that the application of such a statute does not 
implicate First Amendment concerns. 
Boyll supra, at 1341. 
The court in Boyll held that because the federal peyote exemption, "unlike the 
statute in Smith, "is neither neutral nor generally applicable" in that "the plain language of 
the exemption speaks directly to "bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American 
Church," the Court would apply the "compelling interest" test. Id, 
With respect to the first step of the "compelling interest" test, the Court in Boyll 
found that it was uncontradicted that the racially restrictive interpretation of 21 C.F.R. 
1307.31 would impose a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of religion by non-
Indian members of the Native American Church, stating 
An examination of the record as to the nature of peyote 
and its role in the religion practiced by defendants as 
(Indian and non-Indian) members of the Native American 
Church . . . compels the conclusion that the (racially 
restrictive) prohibition most seriously infringes upon 
the observance of the religion. 
8 
The record, thus establishes that the in (indictment for) ' 
" . . . the use of peyote results in a virtual inhibition of the 
•' practice of defend^*"'-? , :~ ;~~ 
M at 1341, quoting People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716 W P .; 81 ^ x > , ><u . 
Appls my Ilk sen, i mil I jiinuiifi", ul o:i.pC;.4ng :iitL.c:sl te^t ;he COL-* :r p.-11 
c :-".JCT- vv::o* : ' • -w compelling (governmental' »rWerest . . . justifies 
s N I U • . i - i w i U d i i < i . >.i .,,iiCii'-iiiCiji r , l i t . Id. 
Acknowledging that drug abuse is "one of the greatest problems aflVctiru1 !h«/ 
health and weir^c vt our population" arid "one of the most serious problems confronting 
.our society to v -»c court held 'that "this amorphru pr ulnm ill 1 M 
justify this serious infringement on the observance of religion " Id. 
In Boyll, the court held tli.it tin Jinn,1 iriiiinnii li.iri f, ml nil' in pir-niif • 111 iJnk v m 
a compelling interest in a racially restrictive interpretation of the exemption as applied to 
t) 
"In the absence of evidence, we cannot simply assume that the 
fis' rhedelic is so baneful that its use must be prohibited to a, 
l\ up of (non-Indian) members but poses no equal threat when 
used bv (Indian) members of the Native American Church." 
la at 13-^ citations omitted). 
The Boyll court also held tlwl the \ n v eMsiemr of M \ I F I m ' '< l IIM'II 
negates the existence of a, compelling interest in prosecuting non-Indian, members of the 
Native American Church ftn fhi'ii idii'iuiis usr nl IHM mlf ' ' In IIT 1 mi I nillir i mi i: t, 
"the federal exemption explicitly establishes a governmental interest in preserving the 
• an 
members of the Native American Church " Id. 
9 
Based upon the foregoing and numerous other legal authorities cited in its 
opinion, the court in Boyll held that "the classification of peyote as a Schedule I 
controlled substance, see 21 U.S.C. 812(c), Schedule (1) (c)(12), does not apply to the 
importation, possession or use of peyote for bona fide ceremonial use by members of the 
Native American Church, regardless of race" and dismissed the indictment against the 
defendant Robert Boyll. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants have a federal and state constitutional 
and statutory rights to possess, use and distribute peyote for religious purposes as 
members of the defendant Native American Church and cannot be lawfully prosecuted 
under Utah law for such conduct because Utah incorporates the federal peyote exemption 
as explained above, and because any racially restrictive interpretation of the exemption 
would violate the First Amendment. 
Accordingly, defendants respectfully request the Court to dismiss the pending 
Informations the above entitled actions. 
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of May, 2001. 
rYNtOt tARD J 
Attorney and Co-CounseTfbrDefentiants 
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^TIFICATE OF SFRVICF 
I 1IKKLBY i/'ER T s'ici;, 1\)\)\, 1 hand delivered a true 
and corre-: ^or\ of the ^NUP ,nid foregoing Memorandum In Support < : 
Motion > Tis. to Mr. David Waym.ent, Assistant Liar. County 
Attorney, at the Fourth Judicial District Court, in Pjovo, Utah 
COLLARD 
''for Defendants 
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KATHRYN COLLARD, St. Bar No. 0697 
THE LAW FIRM OF KATHRYN COLLARD, LC 
Attorney and Co-Counsel for Defendants 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel: (801) 537-5625 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
v. 
JAMES W. MOONEY 
aka: James W.F.E. Mooney 
7592 South 3200 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
DOB: 01/03/19444 
Case No. 001404536 
Judge Harding Sr. 
OTN 
and 
LINDA T. MOONEY 
aka: Linda B.H.W. Mooney 
7295 South 3200 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
Case No. 00140537 
Judge Harding Sr. 
OTN 
and 
OKLEVUEHA EARTHWALKS 
NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 
OF UTAH, INC., 
Case No. 001404538 
Judge Harding Sr. 
Defendants. OTN 
I. PROSECUTORIAL BIAS AGAINST DEFENDANTS' RELIGION PERMEATES 
THE PROSECUTION OF THE DEFENDANTS 
Defendants strongly dispute the prosecutors' obvious attempt to decontextualize the 
facts of this case and portray the Defendants as illicit drug dealers. See, Opposition To Motion 
To Dismiss, hereinafter " Pltf. Mem. 1-3. Defendant James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney is 
an individual of Native American Indian descent who founded the Oklevueha Earth Walks 
Native American Church under the Laws of the State of Utah in April, 1997. Prior to that 
time, defendant James Mooney had a longstanding history of sincere belief and practice as a 
member and medicine man of the Native American Church. He and his wife, Linda, are not 
"principals in OENAC", Pltf. Mem. 2, but are spiritual leaders of the Oklevueha Earth Walks 
Native American Church of Utah. James and Linda Mooney did not repeatedly meet with 
"groups averaging about 10-15 people and distributed peyote, a Schedule One controlled 
substance", nor did they engage "in a pattern of unlawful activity" as the prosecutors 
maliciously contend. Pltf. Mem. 1-2. Moreover, all of the sworn testimony adduced at the 
Preliminary Hearing in the consolidated criminal actions by witnesses called by the 
prosecution, uniformly indicated that James and Linda Mooney provided peyote as a 
sacrament to members of the Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., 
for religious purposes in religious ceremonies. 
Defendants engaged in the foregoing religious activities based upon a reasonable 
belief that their conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Utah law incorporating the federal exception from prosecution 
for Native American Church members using peyote for religious purposes as interpreted by 
the federal court in United States v. BoylU 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D. N.M. 1991). Defendants had 
no intent to violate the criminal law of the State of Utah by their use of peyote for religious 
purposes as members of the Native American Church and this malicious and unconstitutional 
prosecution of Defendants should be immediately dismissed. See, Affidavits of James and 
Linda Mooney, Defs. Exhibits 1 and 2, attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein 
Moreover, the prosecutors' decision to quote sources to the effect that "at its heart, the 
NAC is no more than a mechanism to justify legal institutionalization of an otherwise illegal 
drug" and their statement to that "whatever one may think of the merits of peyote or the 
NAC", Pltf. Mem. 22, belies the prosecutors' obvious personal animosity against the 
Defendants because of their deeply held religious beliefs and practices as members of the 
Native American Church. Although the prosecutors believe that members of the Native 
American Church should not have a legal right to use peyote, their sworn duty is to uphold the 
Utah law giving Defendants the right to do so, whether or not the prosecutors agree with the 
law. Thus, although Defendants refer to the "Plaintiff' in their memoranda, Defendants do 
not believe that the personal views of the prosecutors in this case accurately reflect the legal 
position of the State of Utah or Utah County in this case, since the prosecutors' position is 
directly contrary to applicable state and federal law. 
I UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY INCORPORATES THE FEDERAL 
SCHEDULES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
The Plaintiff concedes that under Utah law, "a controlled substance is any substance 
listed in Utah Code Ann. 58-37-4 (2000 Supp.) or in the schedules contained in the federal 
Controlled Substances Act. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 58-37-3." Pltf. Mem.at 3 (emphasis 
supplied.) 
II UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY INCORPORATES THE SPECIFIC 
EXCEPTION IN THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT FOR 
THE USE OF PEYOTE FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES BY MEMBERS OF 
THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 
The Plaintiff also concedes that "Utah Code Ann., Section 58-37-4 provides that a 
listed substance, here peyote, is considered controlled unless 'specifically excepted or unless 
listed on another schedule.' 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii), (2000 Supp.) (Emphasis supplied)." See, Pltf. 
Mem. 4. 
Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs erroneous argument that peyote is "absenf from the 
list of federally controlled substances by virtue of the regulatory exception for use of peyote 
by members of the Native American Church for religious purposes, Pltf. Mem. 5, Plaintiff 
concedes that peyote is specifically listed as a controlled substance under federal law. See, 
Pltf. Mem. 2-3. Hence, the need for the well-recognized federal exception for the use of 
peyote by members of the Native American Church contained in 21 C.F.R. 1307.31. See. 
United States v. Boyll, 114 F.Supp.1333 (D.N.M. 1991) at 1338-1339. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs fallacious argument that Utah law does not incorporate the 
federal exception, Pltf. Mem. 4, ignores the plain words of the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act and the fact that Utah has maintained the statutory exception for religious use of peyote 
by Native American Church members in one form or another since 1986. As the federal 
district court noted in United States v. Boyll, 114 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), Utah is one of 
at least twenty-three states recognizing the exception, /rf. at 1338. 
Contrary to the Plaintiffs next unsupported argument, this is not a case where the 
federal courts or the State of Utah are "compelled to give (federal) administrative regulations 
controlling weight." Pltf. Mem. 5-6. The Utah Legislature freely chose to incorporate the 
federal exception for peyote use by members of the Native American Church in Utah law. 
Because Utah law specifically incorporates the federal exception for use of peyote by Native 
American Church members, the exception is also Utah law. Hence, there is no issue of 
"federal preemption" as the prosecutors vainly attempt to suggest. Pltf. Mem. 5-6. 
Ill BECAUSE UTAH LAW RECOGNIZES AN EXCEPTION FROM CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 
USING PEYOTE, THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN SMITH DOES 
NOT APPLY 
Although the Plaintiff argues that in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 8872 (1990), the United States Supreme Court has held "that a 
state may criminalize the religious use of peyote without offending the First Amendment,,, 
Pltf. Mem. 7-8, the Plaintiff fails to recognize that Smith has no application in this case 
because the State of Utah has chosen not to criminal the use of peyote by members of the 
Native American Church using peyote for religious purposes by incorporating the federal 
exception into Utah law. By contrast, in Smith, the State of Oregon did not recognize such an 
exception. Thus, the Plaintiffs discussion of Smith is an irrelevant segue that need not be 
traversed. 
Precisely because the State of Utah law recognizes an exception from criminal 
prosecution for members of the Native American Church using peyote for religious purposes, 
the State of Utah has no compelling or any other interest in prosecuting those persons to 
whom it has statutorily granted an exception from such criminal prosecution. Thus, it is a 
violation of due process for the State of Utah to grant members of the Native American 
Church an exception from criminal prosecution for their use of peyote for religious purposes 
and then, as here, criminally prosecute Defendants for engaging in the very activity protected 
under Utah law. 
IV THE UTAH EXCEPTION FOR THE USE OF PEYOTE BY MEMBERS OF 
THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH IS NOT RACIALLY OR OTHERWISE 
RESTRICTIVE 
The Plaintiffs argument that the federal exception for the use of peyote for religious 
purposes by Native American Church members incorporated in Utah law is restricted to 
Native American Indians, finds no support in the plain words of the regulation, which refers 
only to "members of the Native American Church." Even assuming that Plaintiffs argument 
were correct, which Defendants deny, Defendant James Mooney cannot be criminally 
prosecuted under the exception because he is an individual of Native American Indian 
descent. 
In United States v. Boyll, supra, the only decision interpreting the federal exception in 
the Tenth Circuit, the federal district court of New Mexico held that the plain words of the 
regulatory exception and the legislative history of the regulation, did not support a "racially" 
restrictive reading of the exception, limiting its application to Native American Indian 
members of the N.A.C., when Congp^ss could have easily specified such a limitation but 
chose not to do so. See, Boyll, supra, at 1337-1339. l 
Because Utah law incorporates the federal exception for use of peyote for religious 
purposes by Native American Church members, and Boyll is the only decision in the Tenth 
Circuit considering the exception and concluding that the exception is not limited to Native 
American Indians, the Defendants were legally justified in relying on the Utah exception and 
the court's decision in Boyll as a reasonable basis for their belief that their use of peyote as 
1
 Although the Plaintiff claims that "Boyll is easily criticized for its lack of meaningful legal analysis", 
Pltf Mem. 7-8, Plaintiff concedes that "Congress too strong exception to the Court's decision in Smith", 
Pltf Mem. 3, as did Court in Boyll, and as Plaintiffs own authorities recite, for many of the same reasons. 
Compare, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994", 2404-2406, Pltf Mem 
(Attachment) and United States v. Boyll, supra, at 1338-1342. 
members of the Native American Church, was not in violation of any criminal law of the State 
of Utah. 
Similarly, the State's argument that the federal exception for use of peyote by Native 
American Church members, that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 
1994, ("AIRFA"), limits the federal exception from prosecution for members of the Native 
American Church to members of federally recognized Indian Tribes, Pltf. Mem. 6, is 
erroneous. 
Although AIRFA protects the right of members of federally recognized Tribes to use 
peyote in religious ceremonies, AIRFA is inclusive, not exclusive. AIFRA does not exclude 
or prohibit members of non-federally recognized Indian Tribes from using peyote in religious 
ceremonies, nor does it prohibit members of the Native American Church from using peyote 
in religious ceremonies, nor does it criminalize the use of peyote for religious purposes by 
these groups. Additionally, there is nothing in AIRFA or its legislative history, evidencing any 
indication of Congressional intent to limit the breadth of the exception from prosecution for 
Native American Church members granted under 28 U.S.C. 1307.31. See, Pltf. Mem., 
attachment: "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994." 
Defendants contend that any interpretation of AIRFA restricting the right of Native 
American Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, or restricting the right 
of members of the Native American Church who are not members of a federally recognized 
tribe, to use peyote for religious purposes, clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Finally, the laudable purpose of preserving Native American culture that underlies 
AIRFA is in no way at odds with the goal of protecting members of the Native American 
Church using peyote for religious purposes from criminal prosecution underlying the 
regulatory exception from prosecution contained in 28 U.S.C. 1307.31 as incorporated in Utah 
law. In fact, permitting the Native American Church to define its own membership will better 
serve the Government's espoused goal of preserving Native American culture by allowing the 
Native American Church to expand the base of its worshippers. The restrictive interpretation 
of the exception advocated by the Plaintiff in this case, as in Boyll, would only have the 
undesirable effect of marginalizing the Native American Church by decreasing the number of 
individuals who can legally participate in its fundamentally central peyote ceremonies because 
of the fear of criminal prosecution. See, Boyll, supra, at 1339-1340. 
V THE RACIALLY OR OTHERWISE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE FEDERAL EXCEPTION ADVOCATED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks an even more restrictive reading of the exception than 
advanced by the government in Boyll. There, the Government argued that the exception 
should be interpreted to apply to only Native American Indians, whereas here, the Plaintiff is 
arguing that the exemption should only apply to Native American Indians who are members 
of federally recognized Tribes under AIRFA. As the court recognized in Boyll, the use of 
peyote is central to the beliefs of the Native American Church. Thus, any attempt by the 
federal government or the courts to criminalize the religious use of peyote by members of the 
Native American Church based upon their race or their membership in a federally recognized 
tribe, would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See, Boyll, supra, 
at 1339-1342. 
VII THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT BASIS 
FOR DISMISSING THIS PROSECUTION 
Because the protection for individual exercise of religious beliefs from 
government interference under the Utah constitutional provisions cited in Defendants' 
opening Memorandum is at least as broad, if not broader, than that provided in the First 
Amendment to the federal Constitution, the Court should also dismiss the criminal 
actions against Defendants as violative of their rights to the free exercise of religion 
under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law incorporating the federal regulatory exception from criminal prosecution for 
members of the Native American Church using peyote for religious purposes incorporated 
under Utah law, protects James Mooney, a descendent of Native American Indians, and his 
wife, Linda Mooney, and the Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church, from criminal 
prosecution The evidence adduced at the Preliminary Hearing in this matter demonstrates that 
the Defendants' use of peyote falls within the statutory exception. Moreover, the Affidavits of 
the Defendants demonstrate that they had a reasonable belief that their religious use of peyote 
as members of the Native American Church was in conformity with state and federal laws and 
that they had no intent to violate such laws, such that it would be a violation of Defendants' 
rights to due process of law, equal protection of law and the free exercise of their fundamental 
religious beliefs as members of the Native American Church, for this prosecution to proceed. 
Accordingly, the Defendants pray that the Court dismiss the prosecutions against the 
Defendants without further delay. 
DATED this 4th day of July, 2001. ^ 
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